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In the United States, every third child is born to an unwed
mother.' These children are relinquished for adoption at a
greater rate than those born to married mothers.2 Adoption of a
child born to an unwed mother creates a quandary of how best
to protect the parental rights of the father and the privacy
rights of the mother while simultaneously securing the best
interests of the child. Baby Jessica, Baby Richard, and Baby
Emily were highly publicized court cases in the early 1990s
where unmarried birth fathers contested the adoptions of
newborns. The public felt strongly about state courts
disrupting the adoptions of these children vis-A-vis the late
assertion of their birth father's rights, but the United States
Supreme Court declined to review the States' decisions in these
cases.3 In the wake of Baby Jessica, state legislatures, in an
attempt to avert such disrupted adoptions, enacted putative
father registries designed to mandate notice of adoptions to
unwed fathers who file notice of intent to claim paternity with
registries in the prescribed time. A State's putative father
registry protects the rights of an unwed father and an adoptee
within its State.
Recently, in the context of adoptions where interstate travel
was used to thwart their efforts to assert paternity, two unwed
fathers successfully sued in tort for intentional interference

1. Wade F. Horn, Wade Horn on 1998 Child Indicators (uly 25, 2000),
http://lists.his.com/smartmarriages/msg00260.html. "In 1998, fully 33 percent of
all children were born to unwed mothers -an all time high. Among women under
age 25, nearly two-thirds of all first births were out-of-wedlock. For births to
eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds, 74 percent were out-of-wedlock." Id.
2.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION,

ADOPTION

FACTBOOK: UNITED

STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS & RESOURCES 4 (1989). Planned Parenthood

estimates that half of all pregnancies are unintended. AMA Enters Debate on
'Morning-Afler' Pill, COLUMBUS DAILY TRIB., Dec. 2,

2000, http://archive.

shownews.com/2000/dec/20001202news008.asp.
3. Scott. A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of Unwed

Fathers in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363, 379-80 (1996). The
Supreme Court has refused to review unwed fathers' rights in the newborn
adoption cases. It has, however, provided guidance on unwed fathers' rights to
older children. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434

U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). In these cases, the Court
held that a biological connection plus establishing a relationship with a child
preserved an unwed father's rights to his child.
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with their parental rights.4 These costly torts have re-focused
attention on the rights of unwed fathers in adoptions.
Individual state putative father registries cannot protect the
parties in such adoptions, because registration in the State of
conception will not ensure notice of an adoption proceeding in
another State.
This Article analyzes putative father registries and proposes
federal legislation to create a national database that will
enhance and connect the state and local registries. Issues and
events leading to the development of registries are reviewed in
Part I. Putative father registry mechanics and applicable case
law are analyzed in Parts II and Ill. The case law examined
includes unwed fathers' rights, in-state paternity registry
contests, requests for impossibility exceptions exempting
registry requirements, and tortious interference with parental
rights. Part IV argues for a national putative father registry
database and investigates avenues of federal participation and
recommendations for specific legislation.
I.

BACKGROUND

In 1972, the Supreme Court first upheld and defined the
constitutional rights of men who fathered children out of
wedlock. In Stanley v. fIinois, the Court held that equal
protection requires state law to treat the unmarried mothers
and fathers of children similarly.6 This heralded a societal shift
away from deferring to the wishes of unmarried mothers.
Upholding the constitutional rights of unmarried fathers to
their children does not assure that these men will assume
parental responsibilities, however. Protecting paternal rights of
unmarried
fathers
without requiring
corresponding
responsibilities fails to ensure permanent and stable parents for
children because unmarried fathers who have no legally
defined role in their children's lives have no legal requirement
for custody or support. Consonant with enhancing parental
responsibility of undefined and non-custodial parents, between
4 See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W.Va. 1998); Kessel v. Leavitt, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (ordered not published); Smith v. Malouf, 722
So.2d 490

(Miss. 1998),

implied overruling recognized by Adams v. U.S.

Homecrafters, Inc., 744 So.2d 736, 742 (Miss. 1999).
5. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
6. Id.
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1984 and 1996 Congress passed legislation and established
child support guidelines designed to increase the adequacy of
child support sums7 as well as enforcement of its payment.8
The impact of child support legislation on adoption is not
documented, but, unmarried fathers certainly factor into their
adoption decision the nearly inescapable requirement to pay
child support for at least eighteen years if the child is not
adopted.
Adoption has evolved over time in response to these legal
developments and to social trends as well. In the 1970s, the
number of American adoptions decreased in association with
the legalization of abortion and society's increasing acceptance
of single motherhood.9 While reports on adoption rates conflict,
that downward trend apparently continued for the adoption of
infants at least through 1995.1' In contrast, the total number of
all children adopted in 1992 was a substantial 127,441, which
represented a seven percent increase over the prior year.'
The number of adoptions is also affected by foster care

7. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-2378, 98
Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.);
Margaret Campbell Haynes, A Review of Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation
and Application, 31 FAM L.Q. 133, 136 (1997) (book review) (reviewing LAURA W.
MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION (1996))
(noting that the Child Support Enforcement Amendments were designed to
achieve greater adequacy and consistency of awards and required states to
develop guidelines by 1987).
8. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of various titles). With this statute, Congress "radically
transformfed] child support enforcement" and moved the states "toward
centralization, automation, and administrative procedures." Haynes, supra note 7,
at 133.
9. Mary M. Beck, Adoption of Children in Missouri,63 MO. L. REV. 423,428 (1998).
10. See Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Private Adoption Facts, at http://
www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/domestic.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2002). "A variety of factors, including increased access to contraception, the
legalization of abortion and changed social attitudes about unmarried parenting,
have caused the number of white infants placed for adoption in the U.S. to decline
dramatically." Id. "Between 1989 and 1995, 1.7 percent of children born to nevermarried white women were placed for adoption, compared to 19.3 percent before
1973. Among never-married black women, relinquishment rates have ranged from
.2 percent to 1.5 percent." Id.
11. Beck, supra note 9, at 423 n.4. Estimates on numbers of adoptions completed
annually are inexact, because the U.S. Bureau of the Census, other federal
agencies, and most states do not systematically track the total number of
adoptions. Authorities put the number somewhere between 140,000 and 160,000
annually. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in 1
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.0512] [a], [b] (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1998).
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policies, which in turn are affected by laws regarding the
termination of parental rights. The number of adoptions of
children from foster care decreased up to 1990, before federal
and state initiatives caused the number to increase
dramatically. 2 Child protective services emphasize a public
policy of family preservation that prioritizes returning foster
children to the home of their biological parents. 3 But, "[a]bout
one third of the children that return to their homes from foster
care re-enter the foster care system within six months." 4 This
cycle of entering foster care, returning home, and re-entering
foster care blocks children's availability for adoption and
consumes time during which the chances for children to find
permanent adoptive families diminish. 5 One of the factors
responsible for foster care drift is the difficulty in terminating
parental rights, including those of the unwed father. 6 Thus, the
birth father problems that burden the stable placement of
children for adoption exist for foster children as well as
newborns.
Adoption is an important issue to the United States not
merely because it affects many families. Every child adopted is
less likely to grow up in poverty, more likely to obtain an
education, and more likely to have a participating father than a
child raised by a single mother 7 Thus, the personal effects of
adoption upon the individual child and its economic effects
upon the nation are significantly positive.
Suitably, the federal government has implemented a pro
adoption policy. In 1994, Congress authorized federal tax
12. "Foster care adoptions increased 78 percent from 1996 to 2000, as a result of
[federal] and state initiatives" Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Foster Care
Facts, at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/foster.htm
(last
visited May 12,2002) (citing Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
107-136,111 Stat. 2115 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C)).
13. Julie A. Luetschwager, Adoption: Comparison of State Statutes, Analysis of
Barriers,and the Role ofNursing, 7 J. NURSING L. 31, 33 (2000).
14. Id. at 33-34.
15. Id. at 34. The effects of age on adoption are as great as the effects of race on
adoption. Id.at 36.
16. Id.
17. See Beck, supra note 9, at 423. "Children who grow up absent their fathers
are five times more likely to be poor, two to three times more likely to fail at
school and two to three times more likely to suffer from an emotional or
behavioral problem. As teenagers, fatherless children are more likely to commit
crime, engage in early and promiscuous sexual activity and to commit suicide;" Id.
See also Wade F. Horn, Dads Face Sad Statistics, COLUMBUS DAILY TRIB., June 18,
2000, http://archive.showmenews.com/2000/jun20000618comm008. asp.
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credits to adoptive parents for qualified adoption expenses and
provided financial incentives to States for each foster child or
special needs child adopted over a base number. 8 In 2001,
Congress and President Bush re-authorized and increased the
adoption tax credit. 19 While he was in office, President Clinton
directed an Executive Memorandum to the Department of
Health and Human Services effectively recommending
strategies to double the number of American adoptions. 20
Facilitating and supporting adoptions has bipartisan support.
Despite pro-adoption federal policy and case law protecting
the parental rights of birth parents, contested adoptions
continue to arise. Wrenching publicity caught the nation's
attention when the thwarted father of Baby Jessica, who was
born to an unwed mother, disrupted the adoption of a then
two-year-old Jessica.2 Babies Richard and Emily followed
Jessica, and in their wake States began following New York's
lead by enacting putative father registries for unwed fathers in
an effort to decrease contested adoptions.' The Uniform
Adoption Act requires notice either personally or through
publication, 2 while the Uniform Parentage Act and over thirty
18. I.R.C. §§ 23,137 (2001). Adoptive parents are provided with tax credits of up
to $10,000. I.R.C. § 23.
19. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of Title 26).
20. See Memorandum on Adoption and Alternate Permanent Placement of
Children in the Public Child Welfare System, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2209 (1996). See also
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Adoption 2002: A Response to the Presidential
Executive Memorandum on Adoption (Dec. 14, 1996), http://www.
acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/initiatives/adopt2002/2002toc.htm. In 1997, over
500,000 children lived in foster care, but no more than 27,000 were adopted.
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT
AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 25 (1999). The states' family preservation
services probably impede adoption of foster children. Id. at 25-26. But, adoptions
out of foster care did nearly double between 1996 and 2000. See Evan B.
Donaldson Adoption Inst., Foster Care Facts, at http://www.adoptioninstitute.
org/FactOverview/foster.html (last visited May 12, 2002) (noting a seventy-eight
percent increase in adoptions from foster care between 1996 and 2000).
21. In re Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Baby Girl Clausen,
501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App. 1993), aff'd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), aff'd sub
nom,. DeBoer ex rel. Darrow v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993). Jessica's mother had
reported the wrong father at the time of the relinquishment and her biological
father had never consented to the adoption. See In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501
N.W.2d at 194. Upon discovering her existence, he filed a paternity action. Id.
22. See In re Interest in B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 239; In re Petition of Doe, 627
N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The Supreme Court approved of New York's
putative father registry scheme in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
23. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-404, 9 U.L.A. 11 (1994) (requires courts to
determine if a potentially uninformed father can be identified
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States currently have putative father registries. 24
The phenomenon of contested adoption leads to litigation
and demonstrates the inadequacy of existing legal regimes to
secure adoption placements. A 1998 tort award of large
damages for the intentional interference with parental rights
further expanded the rights of unmarried fathers in newborn
adoptions.' This case involved an unwed West Virginia father
whose efforts to establish paternity and to prevent the child's
adoption were thwarted by the mother who moved between
States during her pregnancy. She delivered the baby in
California and ultimately relinquished her child to a Canadian
couple. This case involved a novel application of tort law to a
thwarted father adoption and opens the gates to more such
litigation.26 It also demonstrates the inadequacy of individual
state laws to protect the rights of unmarried biological fathers,
adoptive parents, and children in a globalized world in which
interstate and even international travel is commonplace.
Children, their biological parents, and their adoptive parents
experience extreme anguish in a disrupted adoption.
Intentional interference with parental rights torts can exact
huge economic and psychological tolls on all the parties and
their attorneys. Adopted children, birth mothers, unmarried
birth fathers, adoptive parents, and their respective attorneys
require a solution upon which they can comfortably rely.
Individual state putative father registries can alleviate
problems where the adoption is filed in the State of conception
as long as the statutory scheme contains a time deadline within
which the father must file. But individual registries cannot cure
contests arising where the adoption is filed in a State unknown
to the father. Imagine this hypothetical: college students in
Missouri conceive a child, and the birth mother travels to
deliver and relinquish the baby not in her home State of
Illinois, but in her grandmother's home town in Nebraska. In
this scenario, the birth father has not been notified of his duty
24. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr art. IV, 10 U.L.A. 321 (2000) (requiring registries to
be established). See infra Chart of State Statutes Describing Paternity Registries.
25. See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998). The court did not assess
damages against the mother but did assess crushing money damages against her
relatives and attorney. Id. at 813-14. The court awarded punitive damages totaling
$5,850,000 to five defendants but awarded no damages against the mother. Id. at
814.
26. See id. at 754.
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to file with the Nebraska registry to protect his parental rights
irrespective of whether the mother concealed or disclosed the
pregnancy.
Congress should enact a national putative father registry
database to address the interstate effect of adoptions. This
system would have the dual purposes of facilitating notice of
adoptive proceedings to unmarried birth fathers in interstate
adoptive situations and of promoting secure adoptive
placements. The state putative father registries should file with
the national putative father registry database for every man
who files with the State. Each State should maintain its own
statutory adoption scheme including regulation of the parental
rights and responsibilities of unwed fathers. The national link
should provide a means for the registered unwed father to
obtain notice of the need to protect his parental rights in any of
the participating States despite the interstate travel of the
mother. The federal government should offer funds to the
States for the erection and maintenance of compatible
registries.
States can implement a variety of steps to facilitate the
adoption process and ensure protection of fathers' rights. All
States should enact putative father registries that permit prebirth registration and guarantee notice to a father who files
within a state-set time limit, beyond which notice is not
guaranteed. The registries should exist in a format compatible
with a national database. States should structure individual
state filing such that it is immediately (both by electronic
means and by hard copy) transmitted to the national registry.
State laws should provide for publicizing the existence and
purpose of the registries and notify fathers that filing with the
registry may be used as probative (though not conclusive)
evidence in a paternity child support action. State laws should
require attorneys, state agencies, and/or adoption agencies in a
planned or pending adoption to search the nationally linked
putative father registry before final disposition of the adoption
proceedings.
Furthermore, States should amend their long arm statutes to
assert personal jurisdiction over the putative father who was
served or not served notice in compliance with state law
consonant with the search results of the national databasewhere the State of adoption has proper jurisdiction over a filed
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adoption. States should immunize attorneys, agencies, and
parties from suit for tortious interference with parental rights
where they have complied with the State's adoption procedure
on putative fathers, including searching the national database.
States should place a surcharge on the filing of adoption
petitions to fund their state registries and should charge a
putative father registry filing fee in order to cover the cost of
filing with the national registry. States should develop a
procedure for men to register in forma pauperis where
appropriate.
To protect the privacy of women, Congress and the States
should regulate who may search the registries and criminalize
fraudulent registry filings and searches.
While a national putative father registry link may protect the
rights of birth fathers, it does not assure that these children will
have responsible fathers. State laws should also compel
unmarried fathers to legally establish paternity and assume
parental responsibilities during the period of pregnancy of the
mother and within a short and finite period of time after the
birth where they wish to thwart adoptions. The end result
advances the best interests of children either by insuring the
active participation of birth fathers or securing prompt and
permanent adoptive placements.
I.

PUTATIVE FATHER IEGISTRY MECHANICS

A. Registrationand Notice
The mechanics of paternity registries require a man who
believes he may have fathered a child out of wedlock to file a
notice with the appropriate state agency. Putative father
registries typically operate by providing any registrant with
notice of any adoltion petition for a child of the woman named
in his filing? Notice provides the man with knowledge of any
adoption plan, and thus gives him the opportunity to consent
to the adoption, default on the adoption petition, or argue at
the initial hearing that he should parent the child instead of the
27. Rebeca Aizpuru, Protectingthe Unwed Father'sOpportunity to Parent:A Survey
of PaternityRegistry Statutes, 18 REV. LITIG. 703, 705 (1999). But see VT. STAT. ANN.

tit 15A, §§ 1-110, 3-401 (1995); (establishing a central registry for parents filing an
intent to retain parental rights with the probate courts, but not providing notice of
an adoption).

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1039 2001-2002

1040

HarvardJournalofLaw & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 25

prospective adoptive parents. Such a hearing is intended to
ensure the best interests of the child either by establishing the
biological father's intent and capacity to parent or by securing
the adoptive placement. The putative father registries may exist
alone in a State to guarantee notice,28 but more commonly they
co-exist with a statute that provides consequences for failure to
file by the deadline. These consequences delimit the father's
rights either by cutting off his right to notice, 29 voiding his right
establishing grounds for
to consent to an adoption, ° and/or
31
termination of his parental rights.

Paternity registry deadlines commonly operate to cut off the
notice guarantee for those men registering after the State's
deadline. States have taken different approaches to deadlinessome setting a finite deadline measured from the child's birth,
some setting a deadline up to the time a petition for adoption is
filed, and some setting a hybrid deadline. 2 These deadlines
range from five to thirty days after birth.' Typically, statutes
permit registration prior to birth, making the effective period of
registration nine months plus the State's deadline period.34
28. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-702 (Michie 1987).
29. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144.12A, 600A.6(1) (West 2001).
30. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-19-5-18; Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.030(3)(2)(b).
31. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.2(h) (2001). But see In re Tinya W., 765
N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that failure to register with the
state's putative father registry may be considered in a fitness determination in a
dependency case).
32. Aizpuru, supra note 27, at 716. Utah law provides for a hybrid deadline and
requires that the putative father file before placement of a child for adoption.
Where a child was placed three days after birth and father missed the registration
deadline by one day, Utah held that a firm cutoff date was reasonable and father's
registering "close" to the deadline was of no constitutional importance. Sanchez v.
L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984). This case demonstrates the issues
involved in statutory roving deadlines tied to such untimed events as when the
mother places the child for adoption or when the adoption petition is filed.
33. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1998) (five days after birth); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-5-19(E) (Michie 1978) (ten days after birth); Mo. REV. STAT. §
453.030(3)(2)(b) (2001) (fifteen days after birth); Aizpuru, supra note 27, at 716.
34. ALA. CODE § 26-10c-1(I) (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-106.01(B) (1996); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-18-702 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (Michie1999); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/12.1(B) (2001); IND. CODE § 31-19-5-12 (2000); IOWA CODE §
144.12A (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:400(2) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 210, §
4A (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.33 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2001); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 453.030(3)(2)(B) (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-206 (1999); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5-A(C) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318(E)(3) (1997);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.256(C) (2001); WIS. STAT. § 48.025(2) (2000). Many
other statutes require registration before their state deadline but do not
specifically indicate whether men may register prior to birth even though that
interpretation is left open. See infra Chart of State Statutes Describing Paternity
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States tend to strictly construe registry deadlines against
fathers.35
Where a State's registry has a deadline and a man fails to
register by that deadline, he may or may not be entitled to
notice of an adoption depending upon state law and
constitutional due process guarantees. The Supreme Court has
held on three occasions that an unmarried father is
constitutionally entitled to notice of adoption proceedings of a
child with whom he has established a relationship.36
Additionally, state law often entitles men to notice if they have
filed a timely notice of intent to claim paternity with the
putative father registry, have been adjudicated to be the father,
are the "presumed fathers," or are required to give consent.37
State statutes may define a presumed father as one who has
married or attempted to marry the mother within certain time
frames, has acknowledged his paternity in writing and filed
with the state bureau of vital statistics, has consented to have
his name on the birth certificate, or38 has tissue or blood testing
confirming his biological paternity.
Thus constitutional guarantees and state law requirements
limit the deadlines that can be imposed by putative father
registries in order to protect those fathers who have assumed
certain responsibilities or established relationships with their
Registries.
35. Utah held that a putative father's registration postmarked on the day of the
child's birth but received in the appropriate office after placement of the child for
adoption seven days later did not constitute timely notice preventing termination
of his rights. Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 200-201, 207
(Utah 1984). Alabama attempted to refuse to exempt a putative father from the
putative father registry requirement where he filed a legitimation action but did
not timely file with the registry, but this decision was later reversed. S.C.W. v.
C.B., 2001 WL 29297 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), rev'd sub nom., ExparteS.C.W., 2001 WL
1218940 (Ala.).
36. See infra Part III.A. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In
MichaelH., the Court held constitutional a California statute implementing
a substantive rule of law declaring it to be generally irrelevant for
paternity purposes whether a child conceived, during and born into, an
existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband and
had a prior relationship with him, based on the state legislature's
determination as a matter of overriding social policy that the husband
should be held responsible for the child and that the integrity and privacy
of the family unit should not be impugned.
Id. at 111. The court, in a plurality opinion, held that the unwed father had no
protected liberty interest in the parental relationship. Id.
37. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.060 (2000) (describing notice); Id. § 453.040
(describing whose consent is necessary); Id. § 210.822 (defining presumed fathers).
38. See, e.g., id. § 210.882.
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children. Nonetheless, the full putative father registry
paradigm places increasing responsibility on the man to protect
his own paternal rights. The intention of this system is to
enable the father to effectively assert paternity and assume
related duties, or to timely foreclose his rights so that the child
may safely develop ties to adoptive parents without risk of
disruption.
B. Jurisdictionover InterstateAdoptions and
Non-Resident Fathers
The issue of notice as provided by putative father registries
intersects with an analysis of state-court jurisdiction over
interstate adoption and non-resident fathers. State courts
routinely terminate the parental rights of absent fathers, some
of whom are non-resident fathers, because they default on
adoption petitions after published service. Searching the
national putative father registry database not only promises to
facilitate personal service to registered fathers, its existence
may statutorily eliminate the need for published or personal
service in those cases where the father has not registered and
no constitutional guarantee requires notice. Many jurisdictional
issues are raised, however, about judicial proceedings affecting
the parental rights of absent and non-resident fathers.
Several issues bear on the jurisdictional analysis: 1) whether
States must obtain personal jurisdiction over non-resident birth
parents in adoption cases or whether notice and an opportunity
to be heard suffices; 2) whether a State has subject matter
jurisdiction over the adoption of the child and the relevance of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 39 in
competing state court determinations of paternal rights; 3)
whether compliance with a putative father registry notice
scheme abrogates whatever need for personal jurisdiction
exists and/or satisfies constitutional requirements; and 4) the
relevance and applicability of long arm statutes on such
jurisdiction.40
39. 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 115 (1988).
40. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) guarantees national full
faith and credit to state court custody decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1994). It
does not figure into this jurisdictional analysis, however, because the PKPA
guarantees full faith and credit only to judgments where courts had legitimate
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1994).
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Is PersonalJurisdictionover the FatherRequired?

In 1953, the United State Supreme Court in May v. Anderson4
held that a state court must have in personam jurisdiction over
a parent to make an order that validly affects his/her rights to
child custody. In May, a Wisconsin court did not have in
personam jurisdiction in a dissolution necessary to validate
child custody order with personal service on the mother living
in Ohio with her children.' This holding suggests that service
of notice by publication would not establish in personam
jurisdiction over a non-resident parent for matters affecting
child custody-a question that the court has not addressed in
subsequent cases' and had previously expressly refused to
address in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey. 4
In 1972, the Supreme Court recognized in Stanley v. fllinois45
an unwed father's right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard.46 The Court has subsequently narrowed that right to
fathers who have come forward, identified themselves, and
developed a relationship with, and . assumed some
responsibility for, the child.47 The Court, which decided Stanley
nineteen years after handing down May, cited May in its Stanley
opinion, but did not otherwise suggest that personal
jurisdiction, as distinguished from notice and the right to be
heard, was constitutionally required to resolve a biological
father's rights in an adoption.4 8 Personal jurisdiction was not at
issue in Stanley, which was a wholly intrastate Illinois
dependency case.
The common practice of publishing notice of an adoption to
a non-resident father may not establish personal jurisdiction
under May. A State's long arm statute may be adequate for the
State to obtain jurisdiction over non-resident fathers who have

41. 345 US. 528 (1953).

42. Id. The father had filed the dissolution in Wisconsin, where he lived and
where the family had previously lived together. Id. at 530.
43. See Herma Hill Kay, Adoption in the Conflict ofLaws: The UAA, Not the UCCJA,
Is the Answer, 84 CAL. L. REV. 703,735-36 (1996).
44. 330 U.S. 610, 615-16 (1947) (expressly reserving judgment on whether a
Florida decree of custody has any binding effect on an out of state husband in the
absence of personal jurisdiction).
45. 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
46. Id. at 657-58.
47. See Kay, supra note 43, at 739-40.
48. Stanley, 405 US. at 651.
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conceived a child within the State, however.49
Child custody orders differ substantially from adoption
orders because custody orders are modifiable, apportion
visitation and custody, and do not sever the relationship
between parent and child. In contrast, adoption orders are
final, non-modifiable, and ultimately terminate all biological
parental rights, effecting a permanent severance between
parent and child. While scholars agree that personal
jurisdiction is required over a parent in matters of child
custody," the same scholars observe that the opinion in Stanley
is unclear with respect to whether only notice and an
opportunity to be heard is required to terminate the parental
rights of a birth parent."' The proffered rationale is that
requiring personal jurisdiction would destroy adoption
practice.5 2 Whether this rationale will satisfy due process may
depend upon whether providing only notice and an
opportunity to be heard is adequately related to advancing the
State's legitimate interest in securing permanent placements for
children in adoption and whether a State could obtain personal
jurisdiction without jeopardizing the State's interests in
adoptive placements.53
49. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (2000).
50. Scholars have extensively debated whose opinion in May correctly describes
the need for personal jurisdiction in child custody matters: Justice Burton's
plurality opinion, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, or Justice Jackson's dissent.
See, e.g., Kay, supra note 43, at 735-36.
51. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 856-57 (2d ed. 1988) (criticizing the Stanley court for confusing the role of
personal jurisdiction. The Court had favorably cited May v. Anderson, "which had
held that custody decrees must be based upon personal jurisdiction over the
defendant," and then proceeding to state "that custody of an illegitimate child
may be based upon service by publication, apparently failing to notice that this
statement was quite inconsistent with May v. Anderson.' Id.).
52. See Kay, supra note 43, at 739-40.
53. See E.A. v. State (State ex. rel. W.A.), No. 20000461-CA, 2002 Utah App.
LEXIS 17 (Utah Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2002). Utah recently held that it lacked personal
jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of a man incarcerated in Oklahoma for
a dependent child in Utah because its long arm statute did not enumerate conduct
alleged in the termination petition against the father. Id. at *'11.The court made a
determination that the father had sufficient contacts with the forum State to make
personal jurisdiction constitutional, id. at **7-*'10, and nearly invited its
legislature to amend the long arm statute to include such conduct. Id. at **11, **28.
The court declined to apply the status exception to personal jurisdiction, which is
available in some states to terminate parental rights, because parental rights are
fundamental liberty interests. Id. at *'16-*'17. The court did not consider the
UCCJA, which would dispense with personal )urisdiction, require that
termination of parental rights be in the "home state,' and provide notice to the
father and opportunity to be heard. The dissenting judge argued that the status
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Subject Matter Jurisdictionand the Relevance of the UCCJA

Whereas competing courts analyze who has jurisdiction over

a father's rights, the UCqA has come into play in determining
subject matter jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over the child.m For

example, during an Oregon adoption case, a putative father
filed a paternity action in his home State of California but the
Oregon court terminated the father's rights under its own

putative father registry statute. Upon analysis, the Oregon
court found that the child was born in Oregon, that his birth

mother consented to his adoption in Oregon, and that the child
had been living with his adoptive parents in Oregon. The court
used those facts to assume jurisdiction over the child under the
UCQA." In contrast, the May court held that the domicile of

the children living in Ohio was unimportant to its analysis,
because their domicile did not give either Wisconsin or Ohio
personal jurisdiction to make orders affecting the parent living

in the other State.56 The drafters of the UCCJA and UAA

decided that personal jurisdiction over the absent parent was
unnecessary, 7 but the Uniform Paternity Act (UPA) requires

personal jurisdiction." Subject matter jurisdiction in
termination of parental rights and paternity cases is now
expressly controlled by the UCCJA for child custody and
expressly not controlled in adoption. 9 That the UCCJA
purports to determine subject matter jurisdiction over the child
does not confer authority on the court to order termination of
parental rights if doing so in the absence of personal
jurisdiction over the parent is unconstitutional. Though, upon
challenge, a court could determine that such jurisdiction over
exception to personal jurisdiction should apply to sever a parent-child
relationship
as it does to sever spousal relationships. if Utah
at 32-*41
J.,
could (Billings,
not obtain
dissenting). Importantly, the dissent asserted that Id.
jurisdiction to conduct the termination proceeding
in the case, then no State could
because
the father's
is unlikely
assertyears,
jurisdiction
not abandoned
the child there.
is not
and waswhere
there fortoseven
resided
has notState
present there,
Id. at *f41-*'42.
54. See id. at 729-31.
55. Hylland v. Doe, 867 P.2d 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
56. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953).

5. See Kay, supra note 43, at 736 (explaining that the drafters assumed the

controlling opinion in May was Frankfurter's concurrence, which held that

personal jurisdiction is not required).
58. UNIF. PARENTAGE AaT § 405 (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 324 (2001).
59. Such policy controverts those commentators who argued that the original
UCCJA was intended for modifiable post dissolution custody orders and not final
adoption orders.
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the child trumps personal jurisdiction over a parent in order to
advance the child's best interests.
3.

The Effect of a NationalPutative FatherRegistry on the
JurisdictionalAnalysis

Utilizing a national putative father registry database would
obviate such interstate conflict because when a father registers
in his State, that State would automatically transmit the
registration to the national database. For example, the Oregon
court in Hylland would have searched the national registry,
found the California father, and served him with notice of the
petition. Once served, however, Oregon's jurisdiction over the
father would be suspect under May if the father defaults or
makes a limited appearance to argue the court's lack of
personal jurisdiction.
Utilizing a nationalized registry leads to mixed results for the
absent father. The absent father who has not transformed his
inchoate right into a constitutionally protected right by
registering or assuming parental responsibilities does not even
have the right to notice or an opportunity to be heard.60
Searching the father's state registry and providing notice as per
its law satisfies the father's notice requirement, but if the search
is done by a second State, that State may not be able to establish
personal jurisdiction over him. Thus, while the adoption State
may have satisfied its own and/or the father's state
requirement for notice, the adoption State may or may not have
obtained personal jurisdiction over him and may or may not
even need personal jurisdiction over him to terminate his
rights.
4.

National Registry Must Be Accompanied by Amendment
of State Long-Arm Statutes

The putative father registry database would not resolve these
jurisdictional issues. A determination of the need for notice will
not resolve whether a court needs personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident father who fails to file with the registry in the
State of the adoption if conception occurred in another State.
Resolution of this problem requires each State to amend its

60. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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long arm statutes so that it may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident father when the State searches the national registry
database and provide him with notice and an opportunity to be
heard that satisfies its own and/or his State's statutory notice
requirement. This paradigm assumes that the adoption State
has subject matter jurisdiction over the father's child and
essentially incorporates a reciprocal arrangement between the
father's State and the State of the adoption. If the registered
father responds to notice and proves that he has filed a
paternity action in his State prior to the filing of the adoption
petition, then the two judges should confer and resolve
jurisdiction under the UCCJA.
C. ExistingModel Registry Legislation
The putative father registry statutes and surrounding case
law reveal that an increasing number of States are enacting
such statutes and refining the mechanics that allow an unwed
father to protect his rights. The overarching goal is to establish
procedures that advance the best interests of the child by
quickly providing her a stable and permanent home and by
avoiding disruption of an adoptive placement because a father
untimely asserts his paternity.61 The putative father registries
provide the birth father with the opportunity to protect his
parental rights without having to rely upon either the adoptive
parents or the birth mother for information about the child.
Registries provide a more effective system of notifying the
father of adoption than publishing notice in a newspaper, and
place responsibility upon the father to promptly assume
parental responsibility. 62 Additionally, the putative father
registry protects the privacy and safety of the birth mother, for
three reasons. First, she is not compelled to name the man or
men with whom she has had sexual intercourse. Second, no
newspaper will publish notice to a birth father listing her name.
61. Courts have uniformly held that the timeliness of a father's efforts to assert
pfatemity are the "'most significant' element in determining whether an unwed
ater has created a liberty interest" in his child, because of the state's legitimate
interest in the child's need for early permanence and stability. Robert O. v. Russell
K, 604 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1992). "To conclude that petitioner acted promptly
once he became aware of the child is to fundamentally misconstrue whose
timetable is relevant Promptness is measured in terms of the baby's life not by the
onset of the father's awareness." Id.
62. Steve Kirsch, Adoption Briefs (Fall 1995) (on file with author).
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Finally, she is not compelled to name a father who is abusive
toward her and threatens her and/or the child's safety.
Additionally, adoptive parents can rely upon putative father
registries to increase the security of their adoption.
The Uniform Adoption Act, the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), and the Statute Clarifying the Rights of Unwed Fathers
in Newborn Adoptions (SCRUFNA) offer model legislation for
paternity registries. 63 The Uniform Adoption Act contains a
registry and prohibits compelling a birth mother to reveal the
name of the father, although the court must admonish her on
the dangers of delay and detriment to the child that could
result from her failure to name the father.' The Act also
provides a civil penalty to the birth mother who knowingly
names the wrong father.
SCRUFNA, which was proposed by commentator Scott
Resnik, does not require the birth mother to name the father
and provides notice to every man who registers within thirty
days of a birth.' SCRUFNA, which is intended to override or
replace state law, provides that sexual intercourse constitutes
notice of a possible pregnancy and requires that men must file
a paternity action to secure paternal rights.66 SCRUFNA
requires placement of a newborn whose parents do not both
consent to the adoption in foster care for thirty days.67
The Uniform Parentage Act contains a paternity registration
63. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-304 (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 74-75 (1999); UNIF.
PARENTAGE Acr § 401-23 (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 321-27 (2001); Scott A.
Resnik, supra note 3, at 380 (proposing SCRUFNA).
64. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-304, supranote 63.
65. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 424-25.
66. SCRUFNA also proposes new grounds for termination of paternal rights in
newborn adoptions: physical abuse of the mother during her pregnancy,
conviction for a violent felony within the last ten years, and spuming the birth
mother's request for assistance during the pregnancy. See id. at 426.
67. Countless articles and books are devoted to analysis of the bonding process
between infants and their parents between birth and one month of age. See, e.g.,
Lawrence B. Smith, Bonding and Attachment-When It Goes Right, WASHINGTON
PARENT MAGAZINE, http://www.washingtonparent.com/articles/9711/bonding.
htm (last visited April 23, 2002). Child development specialists also describe the
acquisition of many skills in infants from birth to one month of age. See The Child
Development Web, at http://www.childdevelopmentweb.com/Milestones/
milestones.asp (last visited April 23, 2002). Scholars appear to agree that bonding
and the acquisition of child development skills between birth and one month are
important. SCRUFNA's proposal to place children in foster care for one month
awaiting putative father registration does not advance the infant's bonding with
her parents and transferring her custody to an adoptive home at one month
interrupts the acquisition of skills.
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requirement and requires notice of an adoption to the man who
registers prior to or within thirty days of birth.68 Adoptive
petitioners are required to search the registry for the child
under one year of age whose father has not established a
relationship with her.69 The same section requires the adoptive
petitioner to search a second State's registry if the child's
conception occurred or may have occurred in a second State.
The effect of the non-registration upon a putative father is that
his parental rights may be terminated without notice to him if
the child is under one year of age. He is not required to register
if, prior to the court's termination of his parental rights, he has
established a relationship with the child under the UPA or he
has filed a paternity action for the child.70 The UPA provides a
model for state registries but does not contemplate a linking
national database.
D. Burdens and Benefits of PutativeFatherRegistries
Notice is actually two part-disclosure of the pregnancy
differs from notice of the adoption. Consequently, men may fail
to register because they do not know 1) that they have
conceived a child, 2) that the registry requirement exists, or 3)
that an adoption is planned. Critics of registries argue that few
men know of registries or the need to file to protect their rights.
Some States have enacted laws requiring greater publicizing of
their registries.' Also, women may conceal their pregnancy
from men or otherwise misrepresent the situation.
Additionally, filing with the paternity registry in State A does
not entitle a man to notice of an adoption petition filed in State
B, where the mother may have moved with her child or to
deliver her baby.
These critiques raise certain legal, social, and civil rights
questions. First, whether ignorance of the putative father
registry requirement excuses a man's failure to register.
Second, whether sexual intercourse constitutes adequate notice
68. UNiF. PARENTAGE ACr, §§ 402(a), 415.
69. Id. at § 421.
70. Id. at §§ 404,402.
71. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9(d)(5) (2001); IND. CODE § 31-19-5-14 (2000); MINN.
STAT. § 259.52 (1998); Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.016(7)(2)(3) (2001); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 42-2-202 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.01 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
3107.062 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7506-1.10(2) (2001). See infra Chart of State
Statutes Describing Paternity Registries.
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to a man that he may have conceived a child. Third, whether
compelling a woman to name the father of her child invades
her privacy. Fourth, whether a father's prebirth abandonment
of the mother or physical abuse of the mother during
pregnancy provides constitutional grounds for foreclosing or
limiting his parental rights. Finally, whether filing with the
registry is too burdensome, and whether States should compel
fathers to file a paternity action in addition to filing with the
registry. Because the Supreme Court has declined to review
contested infant adoption cases, diverse state laws and cases
have determined the answers to most of these questions. 72
The most litigated civil rights issues raised by putative father
registries relate to the putative father's ignorance of the
conception, the birth, or of the registry requirement, and the
burdens of the registry requirement. In Lehr v. Robertson,73 the
Supreme Court ruled that the possibility that a putative father
may fail to register because of his ignorance of the registry
requirement did not make New York's putative father registry
law unconstitutional or apparently suffice to excuse the father's
inaction. The Court reasoned that a more open-ended notice
requirement would burden adoptions, threaten the unwed
birth mother's privacy, and impair the finality of adoptions. 74
7
State decisions have dealt with similar issues and echo Lehr. 5
States have begun to assume the theory that sexual intercourse
in itself fairly serves as constructive notice of the possibility of a
pregnancy and some state statutes now provide that sexual
intercourse serves as notice of a conception or the possibility
thereof.76 In other States, courts have developed case law to the
72. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 388-89.
73. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
74. See id. at 265 (cited in Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199,
207 (Utah 1984)).
75. Michigan held that the mother had no duty to inform the unwed father of
the birth of the child. In re TMK, 617 N.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
Nebraska held that ignorance of the five day putative father registry requirement
did not excuse the failure to register even where the mother initially hid her
pregnancy and later misrepresented her intentions to relinquish the infant to
adoption to the putative father, because the father knew of the birth. Friehe v.
Schaad, 545 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Neb. 1996).
76. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-106.01(F) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §19-8-12(a)(6) (2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-204(1) (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1(g) (2001);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.061 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 259.52(8) (1999); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.254 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 16-1505(f)(2) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-30-4.13(1)(2000). New Jersey has no putative father registry but provides that
an act of sexual intercourse constitutes constructive notice (for due process
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same effect-that sexual intercourse serves as constructive
notice of a pregnancy.7 Some States provide a good faith
exception such that a man is entitled to additional notice over
and above sexual intercourse itself if he is actively deceived in
his efforts to investigate whether he conceived a child.7 8
The question of the burdens imposed by putative father
registry requirements was discussed by an Alabama court,
which upheld a putative father registry and quoted favorably
the description of a commentator:
The burden placed on putative fathers under Illinois's
[putative father registry] legislation is not necessarily out of
step with modem mores or the realities of contemporary
heterosexual relationships. Neither is it completely
unrealistic. To meet the burden which the new legislation
places on a putative father, he need neither remain in contact
with a woman with whom he has had sexual intercourse,
nor turn to other sources of information to determine
whether he has conceived a child with her. Under the new
legislation, a putative father need only file with the putative
father registry based on his knowledge that he has had
intercourse with a woman and commence a parentage action
within thirty days of that filing. His interests will not be
jeopardized if he ends relations with her, and his social
habits are not, therefore, greatly affected. By simply mailing
a postcard to the registry and commencing a parentage
action, tasks which can hardly be labeled a burden, a
putative father can preserve his rights to notice and
consent. 79
purposes) that a man may have conceived a child as a result of his acts-unless
the mother actively deceives him and thwarts his efforts to find her thereby
activating the statutory fraud protections. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (West 2000.
An Ohio dissent discussed extensively that state's statute providing that sexual
intercourse with a woman puts a man on notice that if a child is born as a result
and the putative father fails to file with the registry, the child may be adopted
without his consent pursuant to law. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Brooks, 737
N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
77. See In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000);
Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992); In re Adoption of S.J.B, 745
S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1988). In Michigan Supreme Court Justice Levin's dissent in the
Baby Jessica case, he indicated that putative fathers know that sexual intercourse
may result in pregnancy and thus of the opportunity to establish a family and the
need to protect that opportunity. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 687 (Mich.
1993) (Levin, J., dissenting).
78. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
79. Mahrukh S. Hussaini, Incorporating Thwarted Putative Fathers into the Adoption
Scheme: illinois Proposes a Solution After the "Baby Richard" Case, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 189, 220 (1996), quoted in M.V.S. v. V.M.D., 776 So.2d 142, 151 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1999).
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Hussaini examines the putative father registry requirement in
the context of modern sexual mores and suggests they do not
unduly burden the unmarried father. Whatever burden
putative father registries impose on unmarried fathers is offset
by the protections offered to them. In an Arkansas contested
adoption opinion, a justice on the State's Supreme Court
actually called for the development of a registry so that the
State's putative fathers would have the procedural due process
safeguards that New York laws afforded Lehr.80
While most registries guarantee notice to the father who
registers and not to the father who fails to register, an
increasing number of States compel the unwed father to legally
establish paternity or risk losing rights to contest an adoption.
Failure to establish paternity may result in automatic
termination of parental rights or the loss of the right to consent
to an adoption.82 In Quilloin v. Walcott,83 the Supreme Court held
constitutional a Georgia statue requiring an unmarried father
to legitimate the child in order to have veto rights over the
adoption. Ohio has held that a father preserved his right to
consent to an adoption where he established paternity prior to
the filing of an adoption petition even though he failed to file
with the putative father registry within thirty days of birth.' A
considerably greater burden is involved in requiring the
registering father to file a paternity action as well. This burden
is offset by its advancement of the best interests of the child,
because such requirements result in orders of child support,
custody, and visitation and do not permit the father to thwart
the adoption without assuming paternal obligations.
Putative father registries also raise issues with respect to the
rights of birth mothers, including the privacy right of a woman
in not naming the man or men who have or could have
fathered her child:8" in not naming the man who has raped her,
80. In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 612 (Ark. 1988).
81. See infra Chart of State Statutes Describing Paternity Registries.
82. IND. CODE §§ 31-19-5, 31-19-9-12 (2000), provides that a man must register
with the putative father registry within thirty days of notice of a planned adoption
or suffer automatic loss of parental rights. Cf. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.030 (2000)
(holding that a man who does not register loses his rights to consent to an
adoption).
83. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
84. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Brooks, 737 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
85. The privacy interest of an unwed mother not to name the father of her child
was affirmed in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248, 265-65 (1983), and in Robert 0.
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and the safety right of a woman in not naming the abusive
father who may jeopardize her safety or the safety of her
child.86 A woman's right to keep private the identities of the
man or men with whom she has had sexual intercourse is
disregarded by some judges who coerce her to name the
father. 7 Such a requirement is faulty because it tramples the
mother's right to privacy, assumes that a mother can accurately
name the father, and induces potential fathers to rely upon the
mother's accuracy or honesty. 8
A child's rights are affected by the putative father registry
requirement, in that her opportunity to be parented by her
biological father may be foreclosed by his failure to register.8 9 A
v. RusselIK, 604 N.E.2d 99,104 (N.Y. 1992).

86. Studies on the prevalence of domesti, violence "suggest that from one-fifth
to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner
during their lifetime." AMA COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 7 (1991), reprintedin BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 5,5 (Clare Dalton &

Elizabeth M. Schnider eds., 2001). Coerced pregnancy is commonplace in abusive

relationships. See Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character,and Social Change in the

Welfare Reform Debate, 19 L. & POL'Y 205, 215-17 (1997). Perpetrators of domestic
violence seek control over their victims. See Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of
Batteringand the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 146 SMU L. REV. 2117
(1993), reprintedin BATI'ERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra, at 57. "[Seventy-one
percent of babies born to teen mothers] are fathered by men over the age of

twenty. Many of these pregnancies result from abuse ....
'Consensual sex
between an underage youth and an adult presents a high risk of abuse." Maria L.
Imperial, Self-sufficiency andSafety: Welfare Reform for Victims ofDomestic Violence, 5
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 12 (1997). A mother of young children is a

dependent woman and an easy target for abusive control. Relinquishment is likely
to threaten his control and thus aggravate an abusive man. Identifying such a man
as a father poses a safety threat to relinquishing mothers.
87. Judges who insist that the mother reveal the name of the father (even a
seriously abusive father) or refuse to approve the mother's consent to adoption or
transfer of custody of the infant create a particularly coercive situation; forcing the
judge's hand in such a case requires a writ of mandamus to the appellate court,
which is time consuming at a point where time is of the essence (i.e., the newborn
adoptee may remain in the hospital or with a foster family during the writ). Such
delay causes anguish in a relinquishing mother who is typically anxious to know
her child is in the loving arms of her intended parents. Under challenge, state
courts protect a woman's right to privacy in not naming or notifying the father of
the pregnancy, while upholding the putative father registry requirements. In re
Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Ark. 1988); In re Paternity of Baby Doe,
734 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); In re T.M.K., 617 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Mich.
CL App. 302).

88. A relinquishing mother who has been under the influence of alcohol or date
rape drugs at the time of conception is unable to name the man or men who may
have fathered her children. Additionally, her knowledge of biology may be poor,
with the result that she misnames a man as the father because she has had
intercourse with him more frequently, she cannot remember the date of her last
menses, or she likes him better.
89. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In this case, the
Supreme Court noted that it had never decided whether a child has a liberty
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line of Supreme Court cases protects a father's rights to a child
with whom he has established a relationship." However, these
cases deal with children, not newborns, and putative father

registries affect paternal rights to newborn children as well to
older children. The registry's ability to foreclose rights of men
to newborns raises questions of exactly what constitutes a
relationship with a newborn. Questions include whether failure
to register is the same as failure to establish a relationship;
whether failure to establish a relationship with an unborn child
is equivalent to failure to establish a relationship with a
newborn; and whether such failure is in fact pre-birth
abandonment. 9 Some state statutes, case law, and SCRUFNA
provide that pre-birth abandonment is grounds to foreclose the
father's rights. 9' Some States provide that failure to register
interest in maintaining her filial relationship and declined to do so where a child
claimed a due process right to maintain two fathers (one biological and one the
husband of her mother) in California where a statute created a presumption that a.
child's father is the man who is both married to and living with the mother at the
time of the child's birth. Id. at 130-31.
90. See infra Part III.A.
91. New York cases have defined what conduct constitutes a relationship with a
newborn, including pre-birth activities. Determining whether a man formed a
relationship with a newborn may include such factors as whether he paid the
medical bills related to the pregnancy, whether he held himself out as the father,
and perhaps most significantly whether his manifestations of willingness took
place promptly. Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1992). To
establish a relationship with a newborn that merits constitutional protection, the
father must come forward to immediately assume parental responsibilities and he
must do so in a prompt and substantial manner, including public
acknowledgment of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, steps
taken to establish legal responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a
commitment to the child. In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418,425-26 (N.Y. 1990).
92. Alabama codified that pre-birth abandonment is implied consent to
adoption and includes the failure of the father, with reasonable knowledge of
pregnancy, to offer financial assistance and/or emotional support. ALA. CODE §
26-10A-9 (2001). Idaho codified that an unmarried biological father is not a
necessary party if he had actual knowledge of pregnancy but did not pay a fair
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in the pregnancy and the birth,
in accordance with his means. IDAHO CODE §16-1504-2(b)(iii) (1999). Kansas
codified that pre-birth abandonment is grounds for termination of parental rights
where the father had knowledge of the pregnancy but failed to provide support
for the mother during the six months prior to the child's birth. KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-2136(h)(4) (2001). Nebraska codified that consent of the father is not necessary
where he had knowledge of the pregnancy, but failed to provide reasonable
support for the mother during the pregnancy. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.22(5)
(2001). Ohio law states that pre-birth abandonment forecloses a putative father's
right to object to the adoption. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Anderson 2000).
Texas codified pre-birth abandonment as abandonment of the mother during the
pregnancy, and continuing through the birth, by a father's failure to provide
adequate support or medical care for the mother and remaining apart from the
child or failing to support the child after the birth. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
161.001(1)(H) (Vernon 2001). Utah statutory law also provides that payment of
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with the putative father registry is the same as pre-birth
abandonment.'
Foreclosing a biological father's opportunity to parent a child
has advantages and disadvantages to a child, who has the
presumed need for a father. The disadvantage is the loss of a
relationship with a biological father. The advantage is the
establishment of a legally secure relationship with a committed
father. The assumption is that the man who fails to register
signals the likelihood that he will also fail to assume legal
responsibility for the child. The man who does not establish
paternity may pay child support regularly, may pay when it is
convenient, or may not pay at all, cannot add the child to his
health insurance (without proof of paternity), has no legal right
to authorize health care, and may or may not exercise custody
or visitation rights. In enacting putative father registries, States
indicate their preference for the adoptive father who assumes
legal responsibility for the child over the biological father who
fails to formally establish paternity and whose relationship to
the child is a casual or intermittent one.94

expenses related to pregnancy and birth in accordance with the father's means is a
requirement to establish the necessity of his consent to adoption. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) (2001). Utah case law also provides that pre-birth
abandonment can be evidenced by a failure to provide medical care and financial
support and not establishing paternity. In re Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967, 970
(utah 1999). (2001). Wisconsin set out the following factors to determine if a man
had not established a liberty interest in his unborn child: a father's physical
assault upon the mother during her pregnancy, neglect to provide care and
support during the pregnancy even though the father had the opportunity to do
so, failure to attempt to contact the child, write to persons caring For her, or send
cards or gifts, and failure to contribute financially toward medical expenses or
delivery. Christopher C. v. Lori C., No. 92-2782-FT, 1993 WL 138160, at ***4 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993). Additional factors evincing pre-birth abandonment might include
the failure to provide emotional and physical support to the mother during the
pregnancy, the failure to purchase items necessitated by the pregnancy, such as
maternity clothing, and the failure to pay for prenatal medical care or to provide
transportation to and from medical care. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 426-27.
93. Utah provides that failure to register constitutes abandonment and a waiver
and surrender of any right to notice of, or to a hearing in any judicial proceeding
for, the adoption of a child. In such cases the consent of such father to the
adoption is not required. UTAH CODE ANN. § 4.14(2)(b) (2001).
94. A Utah court described the state's interest in speedily identifying those
persons who will assume parental roles over children and discussed policy
implications that must limit the rights of biological fathers. See Wells v. Children s
Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199,203 (Utah 1984). See also UNIV. PARENTAGE ACT §§
402,404,9 U.L.A. 322-23 (2000).
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III. PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY - APPLICABLE CASE LAW
A.

Case Law on the Rights of Unwed Fathers

The Supreme Court has decided several cases defining the
constitutional rights of unwed fathers. In Stanley v. Illinois,95 the
Supreme Court held in 1972 that the State could not remove
children from the custody of an unwed father in a dependency
case, after their mother's death, absent a hearing and a
particularized finding that the father was an unfit parent. In
Stanley, the several children had lived with their father over a
period of time as long as eighteen years since birth.9 6
In Quilloin v. Walcott,' the Court held in 1978 that a Georgia
court did not violate an unwed father's substantive rights when
it applied a 'best interests of the child' standard where the
father had not legitimated the child, had never taken custody of
the child, and had not shouldered any significant responsibility
for the child's rearing. 98 The child in Quilloin was eleven years
of age. 99
In Caban v. Mohammed,' the Court held that an unwed father
only acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause when he demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by actively rearing his child. The
children in Caban were four and six-years-old. 01' In Caban, as in
Quilloin, the State's statutory law provided that only the
mother's consent, and not the father's, was necessary for an
adoption of a child born out of wedlock. The Caban Court
struck down the New York statute on equal protection
grounds, 10 2 whereas the Quilloin Court expressly did not
consider the gender based distinction vis-a-vis the equal
protection claim because it was not presented. °3
These decisions hold that unwed fathers have an inchoate
interest in their children which they can transform into a
95. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
96. Id. at 646.
97. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
98. Id. at 255-56.
99. Id. at 249.
100. 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979).
101. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (referring to Caban).
102. Caban,441 U.S. at 393.
103. Quilloin,434 U.S. at 253 n.13.
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constitutionally protected interest only if they assume
substantial parental responsiblities.1°4 All the children
considered in these Supreme Court unwed-father cases were
beyond infancy. The Caban Court specifically withheld
judgment as to whether newborn adoptions would justify
"setting forth more stringent requirements concerning the
acknowledgment of paternity or a stricter definition of
abandonment." l', State legislatures subsequently revised their
adoption statutes to comply with these cases as predicted by
Justice Stevens in the Caban dissent." 6
B. PutativeFatherRegistry Case Law
Four years later, in 1983, the Court reviewed the next unwed
father case that is the leading case analyzing putative father
registries. In Lehr v. Robertson,"°7 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of New York's putative father registry in the
context of an adoption proceeding. The New York statute
provided notice to certain categories of men, including men
who had filed with the putative father registry, and excluded
those men who had not filed and did not fall into any other
category of presumed father.' The Court held that where the
putative father had not filed with the putative father registry
nor established a substantial relationship with his child, the
State's failure to give him notice of a pending step-parent
adoption proceeding did not deny him due process or equal
protection. The rationale was that the statutes afforded him the
opportunity to develop a protected relationship and
guaranteed him notice of the adoption by filing with New
York's registry.1' 9 The child in Lehr was over two years of
104. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US. 110, 131-32 (1989) (holding that
California's statutory presumption of paternity in the man married to and living
with a child's mother at the time of birth may prevent a biological father from
asserting his paternity and establishing a relationship with his biological child).
105. Caban,441 U.S. at 392 n.11.
106. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,249-50 (1983).
108. Id. at 251. The other categories of men entitled to notice included: those
who had been adjudicated to be the father, those who had been identified as the
father on the child's birth certificate, those who had lived openly with the child
and the child's mother and who had held themselves out to be the father, those
who had been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written statement,
and those who had married the child's mother before the child was six months
old. Id.
109. See id. at 264.
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age. 1 ' Other relevant facts include that the state authority
knew the father's whereabouts; the father had never supported
the child and rarely visited her; and the father filed a paternity
action after the ultimately successful step-parent adoption was
filed."'
The putative father alleged two grounds upon which the trial
court's action in finalizing the adoption without notice to him
was unconstitutional. First, he advanced a due process
challenge premised upon his allegation that his actual or
potential relationship with the child was an interest in liberty
that could not be destroyed without due process of law and
that the statute's failure to provide him notice and an
opportunity to be heard deprived him of that liberty interest
without due process." 2 Second, the father argued that the
putative father registry statute denied him the right to consent
to the adoption and accorded him fewer procedural rights than
the mother and that this gender-based classification violated
the Equal Protection Clause.11 3
The Court held that the New York putative father registry
law did not violate an unwed father's liberty interest in
developing a relationship with his child in that it required
notice to seven categories of putative fathers who are likely to
have assumed some responsibility for the care of their natural
children.114 "[T]he right to receive notice was completely within
appellant's control." 5 The Court reiterated that a biological
connection alone does not trigger full constitutional protection,
and that only when an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
participating in the rearing of his child does his interest in
personal contact with his child acquire substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause." 6 Lehr had not demonstrated a
commitment adequate to transform his inchoate interest into a
constitutionally protected interest and so his due process
challenge failed. The trial court could rely upon the statutory
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 255 (1983).
Id.
See id. at 263-65.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 261.
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notice requirement even though Lehr had subsequently filed a
paternity action in another court, because the State's legitimate
interests in facilitating the adoption of children justified strict7
compliance with the procedural requirements of the statute."
The Lehr court indicated that the possibility that a putative
father may fail to register because of his ignorance of the
registry requirement did not make the law unconstitutional or
suffice to excuse the father's inaction, because a more openended notice requirement would burden adoptions, threaten
the unwed birth mother's privacy, and impair the finality of
adoptions. 18 State decisions have echoed Lehr's holding as to
ignorance of the law. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a
five-day limitation imposed by that State's putative father
registry was constitutional despite the father's excuse that he
did not know of the limitation, because all citizens are
presumed to know the law and "[s]tatutes of limitation bar
evenly the claims of the wary and the unwary and the just and
the unjust." "'
Lehr's equal protection challenge was based upon gender in
that he alleged the New York registry scheme impermissibly
treated mothers and fathers differently. 2 The legislation
guaranteed certain classes of people the right to veto an
adoption, but even though all mothers fell within the favored
class, only some fathers did. The Court observed that laws
"may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when
there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an
important state purpose." 121 It went on to hold, however, that
the registry legislation was intended to establish adoption
procedures that promote the interests of children and that such
legislation could treat unwed mothers and fathers disparately if
the father had either abandoned the child or never established
a relationship with her. 22 Lehr's challenge failed because it was
his own failure to establish a substantial relationship that
removed him from the protected class. Where the mother and
117. See id. at 264-65.
118. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983). The Lehr court's concern for the
birth mother's privacy was later cited in Wells v. Children'sAid Society of Utah, 681
P.2d 199, 207 (Utah 1984).
119. Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Bureau, 385 N.W.2d 448,452 (Neb. 1986).
120. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
121. Id. at 266 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197-99 (1976)).
122. Id. at 267-68.
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father are similarly situated, the statute must treat them
equally, but where the father fails to assume parental
responsibilities, putative father registry notice provisions
legitimately do not offend equal protection."
State cases challenging due process in putative father
registries allege constitutional violations. All courts to date
have found registries constitutional, although courts have
found the application of registry requirements unconstitutional
with reference to certain fact patterns. 124
State cases have held that notice is not required to unwed
fathers who have not established a relationship with the child
nor filed with a putative father registry, without regard for the
length of time permitted by the deadline. Nebraska courts have
found that notice was not required for fathers who had
exceeded the five day registry period if they knew of the
pregnancy/birth, had not indicated any intention to assert their
rights, and had not provided support during the pregnancy or
natal period." The Utah Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a putative father registry where the notice
of paternity had to be filed prior to the date the child was
released to the adoption agency, which was two days after
birth. 26 The Indiana Court of Appeals recently held the Indiana
putative father registry scheme constitutional against a due
process challenge where a father filed twenty-three days after
the birth. 127 The Indiana statute provides a thirty day
registration limit after the father has been served with notice of
the putative father registry requirement. 128 The father was
served seven weeks prior to the birth, so his time had run
before the baby's birth. 29 Finally, the Oregon Court of Appeals
123. See id. at 266-67.
124. See, e.g., In re S.R.S., 408 N.W.2d 272, 272 (Neb. 1987) (holding putative
father registry requirement unconstitutional where unmarried father had daily
contact with the child for the first nineteen months of child's first twenty-four

months); In re Paternity of Baby Girl P.D., 661 N.E.2nd 873, 874-75 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (holding inapplicable statute requiring registration within thirty days where

statutorily required notice was not provided).
125. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Bureau, 385 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Neb.
1986); see also Friehe v. Schaad, 545 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Neb. 1996) (upholding the
constitutionality of the five day registration period).
126. See Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984).
127. Wachowski v. Beke (In re M.G.S), 756 N.E.2d 990 (Ind. 2001).
128. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-15(a) (Michie 2001).
129. Wachowski, 756 N.E.2d at 996. The father did not register until over two
months after receiving notice. Id. at 995-96. The father testified that he delayed
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held that a California resident's failure to file a notice of
paternity in Oregon barred him from receiving notice and
removed his right to consent to the adoption, even though he
had filed a paternity action in California. 3°
Courts have also upheld the constitutionality of the
termination of rights when there is a failure to register
regardless of the mother's identification and notification of the
father. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a putative father
registry notice provision where the mother failed to name the
father, even though she apparently knew his identity and
whereabouts.1 31 The Illinois Appellate Court held that a
putative father was not excused from the ten-day putative
father registry requirement, given he had knowledge of the
pregnancy and the possibility that he could be the father. 32
Louisiana provided a hearing for an Indiana putative father to
prove his fitness and commitment to parental responsibilities
despite filing late for a child born in Louisiana to an Indiana
birth mother where the father executed an authentic "Act of
Acknowledgment" in Louisiana, filed an opposition to the
adoption, and filed with the putative father registry in
Louisiana.'3
Putative father registries have also withstood constitutional
challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause. In M.VS. v.
134 the father alleged a statute violated the Equal
VM.D.,
registering because of the birth mother's statements that adoption was just one
option she was considering. Id. The court was not persuaded because the registry
requirement notice contained a statement that "nothing that the mother of the
child or anyone else may [say] about her intentions regarding a possible adoption
of the child can relieve [the father] of the obligations imposed upon [the father]
having received... notice." Id. at 995. The opinion contains an invitation to the
General Assembly to amend the law to avoid the strict statutory interpretation
that the court felt constrained to deliver. Id. at 1000. The legislature has not yet
responded. Adoption attorney Steve Kirsh, who is closely involved in Indiana
adoption legislation, expects no legislative response to the court's invitation.
Interview with Steven M. Kirsh, Treasurer, American Academy of Adoption
Attorneys (May 1, 2002).
130. See Hylland v. Doe, 867 P.2d 551,555-56 (Or. App. 1994).
131. In re C.J.S., 903 P.2d 304,305 (Okla. 1995).
132. In re KJ.R, 687 N.E.2d 113,118 (M. App. Ct. 1997).
133. In re R.E., 642 So.2d 889, 892 (La. Ct. App. 1994). Interestingly, the opinion
noted that the Louisiana Children's Code § 1138 provided that if the trial court
establishes the putative father's parental rights and he refuses to consent to the
adoption, the trial court shall order him to reimburse the department or the
licensed private adoption agency of all medical expenses incurred for the mother
and the child in connection with the birth. Id. The Children's Code was amended
in 2001 to make such an order discretionary for the trial judge. 2001 La. Acts 910.
134. 776 So.2d 142,145 (Ala. App. 1999).
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Protection Clause because men who registered with the
putative father registry were treated differently than those who
did not register. The Alabama court applied rational basis
scrutiny and held that treating these fathers differently was
permissible because it reasonably advanced a legitimate
government interest: the provision of "a legal means to
ascertain within a short time of a child's birth whether the
biological father is going to assert his rights and perform his
corresponding duties." 3 '
Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Nebraska Supreme
Court similarly upheld the differential treatment afforded
136
unwed mothers versus unwed fathers under registry laws.
The court analyzed the effect of birth upon a mother, the effect
of the five-day limit imposed by that State's putative father
registry, and the effect of a rapid determination of parental
rights upon the best interests of the child. The court concluded
that the legislation accomplished related goals and addressed
legitimate concerns. 37 Thus, the statute was constitutionally
applied.
C. Impossibility Exception Case Law

A number of state courts have established impossibility
exceptions for the father whose efforts to parent the child were
affirmatively thwarted. These exceptions cover situations
including: (1) where the father did not know the mother was
pregnant; (2) where the mother misrepresented the situation to
the father such that she indicated falsely that she was not
pregnant or that he was not the father; and (3) where the
mother moved from the State of conception to a second State
for delivery.
Where fathers have requested impossibility exceptions due
to lack of knowledge of the pregnancy, courts have denied
them if the father made no attempt to investigate the possibility
of pregnancy. For example, South Dakota withheld an
135. Id. at 153.
136. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Bureau, 385 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Neb.
1986).
137. See id. at 452. Although the court describes its reasoning as strict scrutiny,
the section of the opinion that focused on the 'narrow tailoring' aspect of
heightened scrutiny in fact seems to operate more like a rational basis test, or at
best, intermediate scrutiny. Id.
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impossibility exception for a father's failure to assert paternity
within sixty days of the birth, despite lack of notice by the
mother, where the father did not investigate to see if
conception occurred, did not support the mother during her
pregnancy, and did not take immediate action when he learned
of the child.' New York also withheld the impossibility
exception from a man where he took no "steps to discover the
pregnancy or the birth of the child before first asserting his
parental interest ten months after the adoption became final."139
New York specifically denied the father's claim that the mother
had a duty to ensure he knew of the birth given that the mother
made no attempts to conceal her whereabouts or her
pregnancy. 4 ' Utah codified a similar rule, whereby a man is
deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and adoption
proceeding may occur simply by virtue of having engaged in a
sexual relationship with a woman 41
Fathers have also requested impossibility exceptions where
they knew the locations of the mothers but the mothers had
misrepresented the identity of the father to either the father or
to some third party. For example, Arkansas held a father to its
registry requirement where the mother falsely swore in her
petition for step-parent adoption that the father was
unknown.' In a slightly different situation, Illinois provided
no impossibility exception where the father knew of the
existence of the eighteen-month-old child but took no action to
pursue the possibility of his own paternity because the mother
and her family told him that another man was the father.'
Under similar circumstances and in the same year, Illinois
again denied the impossibility exception even though the
mother falsely indicated that the father was another man,
138. See In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 99-100 (S.D. 1996). The court noted
that the mother misrepresented to the court that she did not know the identity of
the father and that the father and mother's relationship lasted only 2 weeks after
which father did not attempt to contact the mother to determine if she was
pregnant. See id.
139. Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. 1992) ("Inasmuch as
petitioner failed to take any steps to discover the pregnancy or the birth of the

child before first asserting his parental interest ten months after the adoption
became final, we conclude he was neither entitled to notice nor was his consent to
the adoption required.").
140. See id. at 101.
141. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.13(1) (2001).
142. See In re Adoption of Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607, 609-10 (1992).
143. See In re A.S.B., 688 N.E.2d 1215,1222(Il. App.Ct.1997).
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because the putative father knew of the pregnancy and the
possibility of his own paternity but did not file with the
registry. 44 The KJ.R. court articulated the statutory elements of
the Illinois impossibility exception to include when: (1)
registration with the putative father registry within the time
period specified by the State was not possible; (2) failure to
register was through no fault of the father; and (3) the father
registered within ten days after it became possible for him to
file. 45 The KJ.R. court specifically reiterated the Illinois
statutory language that a lack of knowledge of the pregnancy
or birth does not constitute an acceptable reason for failing to
register. 146 Minnesota denied an exception to the registry
requirement where the mother wrote the father that she was
planning to terminate her pregnancy and he did not learn of
the child until after the mother gave birth and relinquished him
to adoption.4 In another instance, Nebraska disregarded a
mother's misrepresentation to the adoption agency that the
father's identity was unknown and held that a certificate from
the putative father registry could substitute for the father's
consent.48
Fathers have also requested impossibility exceptions because
mothers traveled among States and therefore made it difficult
for them to know in which jurisdiction to assert their paternity.
In 1980, Utah held in Ellis v. Social Services Department of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints1 49 that "due process

requires that an [unwed father] be permitted to show that he
was not afforded reasonable opportunity to comply with the
[registry requirement]." 5 ' The court hinted that two elements
must exist for such an exception to apply: (1) timely filing with

144. In re K.J.R., 687 N.E.2d 113,117-18 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997).
145. Id at 117.
146. Id.
147. See In re Paternity of J.A.V., 547 N.W.2d 374, 375-77 (Minn. 1996). While
denying the father future notice of the adoption proceedings because of his failure
to file with the registry, the court permitted him to establish paternity. See id. at
375.
148. See In re Adoption of Kassandra B., 540 N.W.2d 554, 555, 560 (Neb. 1995).
Although the court stated a certificate from the putative father registry could have
substituted for the father's consent, no such certificate was filed in this case. See id.
149. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980).
150. Id. at 1256 (holding that an unwed father was denied due process because
the court did not afford him the opportunity to show that he could not have
reasonably expected his baby to be born in Utah).
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the registry was impossible for the father; and (2) the father's
failure to file was through no fault of his own."5 ' In Ellis, a
couple conceived in California and the mother moved to Utah
for the birth of the child without notifying father of where she
would give birth. Under these circumstances, Utah held that an
impossibility exception may be warranted and remanded to the
lower court to allow the father the opportunity to prove he
could not have reasonably expected the baby to be born in
Utah. Fourteen years later, Oregon reached a contrary decision
under nearly identical facts. In Hylland v. Doe (In re Adoption of
Baby Boy Hylland/Ohnemus),'52 a couple conceived in California
and the mother moved to Oregon without notifying the father
of where she would give birth. The Hylland court did not afford
the father an impossibility exception, even though the father
had filed a paternity action in California, because he failed to
file with the Oregon registry and did not present
demonstrative evidence that he had supported or attempted to
support the child." 3
A Minnesota appeals court recently denied an impossibility
exception to a father who lived with the birth mother in Iowa
and conceived the child in Iowa before the mother moved to
Illinois and later to Minnesota, where she lived with her
grandparents and later in a home for pregnant teens and where
she relinquished the child."s The mother did not inform the
father of her whereabouts after they parted even though they
communicated by email. 55 The birth father asked the mother's
parents and friends where she was, but they did not inform
him either.'56 The birth father was aware that the birth mother's
mother and sisters moved to Minnesota. 57 The Minnesota
statute provides notice to the father who files with the putative
father registry within thirty days after birth and provides that
the father who fails to register within thirty days loses his right
to assert any interest in the proceeding and is considered to

151. See id.
152. 867 P.2d 551,553 (Or. Ct App. 1994).
153. Id. at 556-57.
154. Heidbreder v. Carton, 636 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review
granted,2002 Minn. Lexis 87 (Feb. 19,2002) (No. CO-01-739).
155. Id. at 836.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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have abandoned the child." 8 The father registered with the
Minnesota registry on the thirty-first day, which was one day
after learning the mother had given birth in Minnesota. 5 9 The
court grounded its denial of an impossibility exception on the
father's knowledge of the three States, Iowa, Illinois, and
Minnesota, to which the mother had recent ties, that the mother
was carrying his child during the pregnancy, that she planned
to give birth, the due date, that he and the mother would not
marry, and that she did not wish to share her whereabouts
with him.160 The court also commented that the father had nine
months to register but did not do so, did not retain a lawyer,
did not commence a paternity action, did not register as a
putative father in any State, and did not otherwise arrange to
become a parent.' 61 A distillation of the key variables in
Minnesota's decision are that the father had enough
information about mother's whereabouts to protect or make a
showing of protecting his parental rights in any of three States
and did not attempt to establish a legal relationship with his
child in any way.
Utah granted no impossibility exception where the mother
notified the father that she was moving to Utah from California
to give birth and to place the child for adoption, and the father
failed to file with the Utah registry. 62 In that case, the putative
father filed a paternity action in California but neither filed
with the Utah putative father registry nor filed a paternity
action in Utah, even though he was aware that the mother and
baby were in Utah."6 Under nearly identical facts, Utah again
withheld an impossibility exception where the putative father
was a resident of Washington State and was informed by the
mother of her move to Utah to live with the prospective
adoptive parents." Although he telephoned the birth mother
158. MINN. STAT. § 259-52 (2001). The court held that the mother and father's
living together openly did not entitle the father to notice because it occurred
before the birth and not after. Id. at 837.
159. Heidbreder,636 N.W.2d at 836.
160. Id. at 838.
161. Id. The father claimed that the mother fraudulently concealed her
whereabouts, but this argument did not persuade the court because Minnesota's
explicit impossibility exception does not include an express or implied fraud
exception. Id. at 838-39.
162 See Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
163. Id. at 894-95.
164. See C.F. v. D.D. (In re Adoption of B.B.D), 984 P.2d 967, 969, 974-75 (Utah
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in Utah and attempted to establish paternity by registration in
Washington, he did not file with the Utah putative father
registry or file any paternity actions in either Washington or
Utah.' The key variable in these cases was father's knowledge
of mother's whereabouts.
In a slightly different situation Utah allowed an impossibility
exception for a California putative father where the birth
mother notified him of her move to Utah and her plan to
relinquish the child for adoption but subsequently
misrepresented to him that she would marry him and raise the
child with hi.166 The father did not file with the Utah registry
nor file a paternity action but was in the process of moving
their belongings to a new home when the child was born
prematurely and the mother relinquished him to adoption.16 7
Additionally, the birth mother's family also misled the putative
father. 168 The key variable in this case was that, even though the
father knew of mother's whereabouts, she induced his reliance
upon her misrepresentation that she would marry him and
they would raise the child together.
In yet another moderately different situation, Utah did not
allow an impossibility exception where an Indiana putative
father filed a paternity action in Indiana one day after the
child's birth in Nevada, and, on the same day, the adoptive
couple filed their adoption petition in Utah.169 The putative
father did not, however, file with the putative father registry in
Utah until eight months after learning of the child's birth and
the Utah adoption proceedings.7 0 At that time, Utah statutorily
required a putative father to file a notice of paternity within ten
days after it became possible for him to file.17' The key variable
in this case was the father's delayed filing after acquiring
knowledge of the child's whereabouts.
The elements of an impossibility exception vary by State. A
mother's fraudulent misrepresentation to the father that she is
either not pregnant, or has aborted or miscarried the baby and
1999).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id.at 969.
See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 691 (Utah 1986).
See id. at 687.
See id. at 688.
See In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113,1115,1120-21 (Utah Ct App. 1995).
See id. at 1115,1120.
See id. at 1118-19 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (Supp. 1990)).
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a mother's concealed move to a second State have warranted
impossibility exceptions in some but not all cases. A national
putative father registry database would provide a means for
fathers to protect their rights despite the whereabouts of the
mother or her representations to the father in any participating
State.
D. Tortious Interferencewith ParentalRights Case Law

In 1998, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Smith v.
Malouf, 72 and the West Virginia Supreme Court decided Kessel
v. Leavitt.'73 Both cases were tort actions for intentional
interference with parental relationships or custody in interstate
adoptions. The intentional interference with parental
relationships tort is not reserved to adoption situations and is
not recognized in all jurisdictions.' 74 Smith and Kessel are
important to a discussion of putative father registries because
individual state registries can not and did not protect the
parties in these cases, but a national putative father registry
theoretically would have protected the fathers' rights in both of
these cases where the mothers used interstate travel to thwart
the fathers' rights.175
The father in Smith sued the mother and her family for civil
conspiracies to effect an illegal adoption of his child born out of
wedlock and to prevent him from exercising his parental rights
and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 76 The court
framed the "pivotal question" as "whether [a birth mother] and
her parents owe damages [to a birth father] for interfering with
his right to attempt to gain custody of the child by exercising
her own right to terminate her relationship with the child."1 77

172. 722 So. 2d 490 (Miss. 1998), implied overruling on other grounds recognized in

Adams v. Homecrafters, Inc., 744 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999). The more stringent test
for recovery of damages under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional

distress, announced in Smith, was expanded in Adams, but this has no bearing on
the analysis for this Article.
173. 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
174. See Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1047 (Fla. 1999) (holding that a cause of
action for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship by a third
party non-parent existed in Florida). But cf Lapides v. Trabbic, 758 A.2d 1114,
1121 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding facts did not warrant recognition of new
tort for intentional interference with parental custody).
175. See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 492; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 734-36.
176. Smith, 722 So. 2d at 491-92.
177. Id. at 498.
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In comparison, the father in Kessel sued for fraudulent
concealment, civil conspiracy for fraudulent concealment of
information regarding the location and adoption of the child,
1 78 The
and tortious interference with parental relationship.
court held that:
[Tb0 make out a prima facie claim for tortious interference
with parental relationship, the complaining parent must
demonstrate: (1) the complaining parent has a right to
establish or maintain a parental or custodial relationship...;
(2) a party outside of the relationship between the
complaining parent and his/her child intentionally
interfered with the ... relationship; (3) the outside party's
intentional interference caused harm to the... relationship;
79
and (4) damages resulted from such interference.1
The remarkable commonalities between Smith andKessel satisfy
the requirements of Kessel and the similar holdings answer
Smith's pivotal question.
Smith was a teenager and Kessel was a medical student
completing his residency requirement. 80 Both fathers were
unmarried, established their rights to develop a parental
relationship with their unborn children by filing paternity
actions that they won by default, and obtained temporary
restraining orders to halt potential adoptions of their unborn
children.' 8 ' Accordingly, the fathers clearly had rights to
establish parental relationships, which in turn satisfied the first
element required by the Kessel court.
In both cases, multiple parties, including the birth mothers,
their parents, siblings, and attorneys, concealed information
about the mothers' whereabouts despite persistent and
substantial efforts of the fathers to locate them. 8 2 Both mothers
used interstate travel to overcome the investigative and legal
efforts of the fathers. The combinations of people concealing
information constituted conspiracies in each case. The
conspiracies operated to interfere with the rights of the fathers
to establish a relationship with each child, which satisfied the
second element in Kessel, that there must be an outside party

178,
179.
180.
181.
182.

Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 765-66.
See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 492; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 734 n.4.
See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 492; Kessel,511 S.E.2d at 734-37.
See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 492-93; Kessel,511 S.E.2d at 734-39.
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that interferes in the relationship.
The concealment conspiracies and the interstate travel of the
birth mothers, as well as the failure to heed the temporary
restraining orders, worked to prevent the fathers from
intervening in the adoptions. Ultimately, Smith's daughter and
Kessel's son were relinquished by their respective mothers in
California and adopted by Canadian couples.'3 The Canadian4
courts did not permit the fathers to disrupt the adoptions,'8
whereas courts in the United States might have provided
impossibility exceptions and interrupted the adoptions. The
interference of outside parties prevented fathers from vetoing
adoptions which in turn satisfied Kessel's third element of harm
to the relationship.
Mississippi and West Virginia held that the fathers lost their
opportunities to establish relationships with their infants as a
result of the information concealed by multiple persons and
that the lost parental relationships constituted the fourth
element, damages."s The holdings answered the pivotal
question set out in Smith in the affirmative-that the birth
mothers' families owed damages to the birth fathers. Smith's
pivotal question, however, is wrongly worded. It is not the
mothers exercising their rights to terminate their relationships
with their children that caused the damages, but rather the
mothers' and their families' conspiracies to conceal the States of
the birth and the States and countries of the adoptions and
their refusal to honor the temporary restraining orders that
caused the harm that resulted in the damages. 86
The only solution to the losses suffered by these fathers lies
in the erection of a national putative father registry. Had one
existed, the attorneys representing the Smith and Kessel birth
mothers or adoptive parents would have searched the national
putative father registry and subsequently served notice upon
183. See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 492; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 736.
184. See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 492-93; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 738.
185. See Smith, 722 So. 2d at 498; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 768.
186. Justice Smith's separate opinion in Smith raises three compelling but
unavailing arguments: (1) that protecting putative fathers' rights will vitiate birth
mothers' reproductive liberty interests; (2) that gender differences justify a rule
that gives the mother the exclusive right to consent to adoption; and (3) that the
majority's holding therefore encourages mothers to choose abortion, the only
reproductive liberty interest of which they have complete control. Smith, 722 So.2d
at 502-05 (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the fathers. The fathers could have intervened in the adoptions
promptly, and the adoptions either would or would not have
happened, but courts would have been able to promptly decide
whether the fathers had the rights to intervene and whether
intervention was in the best interest of the children. The fathers
would not have been forced to sue for tortious interference
with parental relationship. In sum, a national registry would
better protect children like those in Smith and Kessel.
IV. TOWARD A NATIONAL PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY

The federal government should erect and maintain a putative
father database to which each State may contribute data and
from which authorized attorneys and agencies in each State
may access data. Each State's law should continue to control
adoption practice in its State and the use (or non-use) of the
national putative father registry databank. Only a federal
source can solve the problems present in a society where
interstate travel of men and women operates to thwart the
rights of fathers in adoptions. Fathers lose control of adoptive
situations because they cannot locate their children within the
United States; adoptive couples choose international adoptions
to avoid the late assertion of birth fathers' rights; and women
without means undertake to raise children while remaining
unsure of participation by birth fathers. Only a national
putative father registry can solve these problems for the
nation's children.
The purpose of the registry advances the interests of all three
parties. A nationally-linked putative father registry can
promote the speedy and secure placement of children with
natural parents or with adoptive parents by resolving birthparent rights issues quickly and finally. Such a system would
advance a secure and speedy placement of a child with
adoptive parents where a biological father fails to register. This
conforms with the notion that quick and efficient placement
serves society and the child best. 87
A national putative father databank advances putative
fathers' interests, in that it provides them with a means of
187. For a discussion of three historical models for evaluating biological fathers'

rihts, see Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a Defense in PaternityActions,10 TEX. J.
OMEN & L. 69 (2000).
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enforcing their rights to their children, particularly newborns.
The national registry provides absolute notice of a pending
adoption in participating States and this in turn affords much
greater protection to the putative father than is currently
available. Currently, mothers may not identify the father by
name, and States routinely publish service in obscure
newspapers- often under the name of John Doe. The national
registry, on the other hand, provides meaningful notice to
putative fathers at the addresses they provide the registry.
Additionally, the registry correctly proclaims to putative
fathers that responsibility to assert and protect their rights is
theirs and that reliance upon birth mothers is misplaced.
A national putative father registry advances the privacy and
safety interests of mothers as well as assisting their adoption
decision by clarifying the intentions and rights of birth fathers.
The erection of a national registry provides States with the
ability to relieve women of naming unwed fathers of their
children. This protects the privacy right of a woman not to
name the man or men with whom she has had sexual
intercourse and relieves the woman of the need to accurately
identify the father when she may or may not know his identity.
Importantly, protecting mothers' privacy rights also protects
their safety from abusive men with whom they have fathered a
child, because the registry does not need to disclose the
mother's address or location. For example, a woman may
conceive her child in Alabama, deliver and relinquish her child
for adoption in Kansas, and ultimately decide to settle in
Missouri. The registry only needs to provide information about
the adoption proceeding in Kansas, so the woman's actual
location is concealed. State law would control whether the
father's right to consent is affected by his abuse and/or rape.
Women could forum shop for the State providing them the
most safety.
Additionally, a national registry provides pregnant women
with information with which to make their adoption decisions.
Women who are not able to raise a child may consider
adoption but find their decision impeded by the unknown or at
least the unpredictable intentions of the father. A registry
notifies a woman of a father's intentions to assert his paternity.
State law should require the registering father to file a paternity
action. Information concerning fathers' intentions and paternity
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actions substantially affect mothers' adoption decisions. With
this information, a mother may be able to determine how much
paternal financial and custodial assistance she can rely upon.
Lastly, a natiorial putative father registry advances the
interests of adoptive parents who want to share their lives with
a child but fear disruption of the relationship by the late
assertion of a birth father's rights.
A. FederalParticipationin NationalPutativeFatherRegistry
Congress is the appropriate legislative body for putative
father registry legislation because adoption has a federal
aspect, in that a woman may conceive a child in one State,
reside in a second State, give birth in a third State, and
relinquish for adoption in a fourth State. It is in this situation,
where the biological mother, biological father, the adoptive
parent(s), and the child have connections to two or more States,
that the individual state putative father registries can neither
protect the rights of putative fathers nor advance the interests
of children. Only federal legislation providing a national
database, linking all participating state registries, can
effectively address this family-law problem, even though
family law, including adoption, is traditionally reserved to the
States. This precise rationale underlies other federal statutes,
including most notably the Child Support Recovery Act.188
Congress may enact a federal putative father registry
database under the commerce power. Adoption is not
traditionally considered commerce because nothing is bought
or sold. Interstate adoption substantially affects interstate
commerce, however, because of the aggregate transaction costs
involved. Adoptive parents may incur large legal debts,
ranging between zero and $30,000,189 across at least two States.
188. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992,18 U.S.C. § 228 (2001). "Every federal
circuit that has considered the issues has determined that the CSRA [Child
Support Recovery Act] is a valid exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause." Laura W. Morgan, A FederalHand In Child Support, 23 FAM.

ADVOC. 10, 14 (2001). Morgan goes on to list cases from each circuit which held
the CSRA constitutional. Id.
189. See Nat'l Adoption Info. Clearinghouse, Costs of Adopting, at
http://www.calib.com/naic/pubs/sLcost.htm (last modified Aug. 2, 2000).
Domestic private-agency adoption costs range between $4,000 to $30,000;
domestic independent adoption costs range between $8,000 and $30,000; and
domestic public agency fees range from zero to $2,500. See id. These costs may
include: court costs, adoptive home investigations (including physical
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Part of that debt derives from the interstate nature of the
adoption, which necessarily involves interstate travel. These
burdens, plus an increased likelihood of litigation resulting
from incompatible and unconnected state registries, increase
the expense incurred in interstate commerce. A federal registry
statute, therefore, will regulate an area "substantially
affect[ing] interstate commerce." 9 ' The commerce power, then,
will allow Congress to erect and operate a national putative
father registry database.' 9 '
A secure authority for securing state participation, and
providing funding to States, is the spending power. The
Supreme Court has adopted the view that Congress has broad
authority to tax and spend for the general welfare.' 92 A
nationally linked putative father database would both advance
children's rights to stable and permanent homes and protect
the liberty interest unmarried fathers have in developing
relationships with their children. These two benefits
demonstrate that a national registry database would serve the
general welfare of the nation.
examinations for each prospective parent), post-placement studies, agency fees,
attorney fees, birth mother medical and counseling expenses, and birth parent
living expenses. See id; see also Melinda Lucas, Adoption: DistinguishingBetween
Gray Market and Black Market Activities, 34 FAM. L.Q. 553 (2000). Lucas's cost
comparison between independent and public agency adoption is misleading, in
that she omits much information on domestic private agency adoptions, i.e., she
does not indicate that private agency adoptions (like independent adoptions)
reimburse birth mother living expenses. Furthermore, comparing independent
and public agency adoption costs is not illustrative because many, if not most,
public agencies arrange adoptions of children who have been made wards of the
court and placed in foster care; such adoptions are commonly subsidized by the
state. Domestic private agency adoptions and domestic independent adoptions
are more likely to arrange adoptions of similarly placed infants or children and
comparing them yields a truer analysis. Lucas also reports other misinformation,
including statements that home studies are not required in domestic independent
adoptions. Id. at 555.
190. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
191. See id. ("Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.") (citations omitted).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Certain limitations,
however, attach to Congress's ability to enact a registry under its taxing Power.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may tax and spend for the general
welfare under the taxing and spending power so long as it does not violate other
constitutional provisions, see id. at 66, and so long as Congress's choice is neither
clearly wrong nor a display of arbitrary power versus an exercise of judgment, see
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937). The Supreme Court has also
required Congress to expressly state the conditions for receipt of federal grants to
state governments. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981).

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1074 2001-2002

No. 3]

Toward a NationalPutative FatherRegistry

1075

The Supreme Court has explained that Congress may
permissibly set conditions for the receipt of federal funds even
as to areas that Congress might otherwise not be able to
regulate."9 Such an arrangement is particularly applicable to a
congressional grant of funds to the States for family law
purposes, i.e., the erection of state registries compatible with a
national database. Specifically, the Court wrote, "[w]hile the
United States is not concerned with, and has no power to
regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it
does have power to fix the terms upon which its money
allotments to States shall be disbursed." 4 The Court continued
this reasoning in South Dakota v. Dole,195 where Congress sought
to create a minimum drinking age by withholding a portion of
federal highway funds from States that failed to impose such a
minimum drinking age. 196 The Court permitted this
conditioning of federal funds, because it served the general
welfare by providing for safer interstate travel and it could be
characterized as a permissible economic inducement as
opposed to coercion.' 97 Congress may therefore provide money
to States to erect state-level putative father registries and
condition this and other federal monies on compliance with
national putative father registry guidelines.
In summary, the rationale for such federal intervention into
family law, which is traditionally reserved to the States, are the
facts that individual States cannot effectively address the
problems typically associated with contested interstate
adoptions and that only a federally established nationally
linked putative father database can solve the problems. A
national database may be erected by Congress under the
commerce power, and state funding and cooperation may be
secured through the spending power.

193. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,143 (1947).
194. See id.
195. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
196. ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 203
(1997).
197. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,16667 (1992) (holding that Congress may induce behavior by putting conditions on
grants but may not compel state legislative action).
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B. Recommendationsfor CongressionalLegislationfor a
National PutativeFatherDatabase
This Article recommends that Congress enact legislation that
establishes a national database for putative fathers who have
registered in any of the individual States and provide grants to
each State tied to the development of a putative father registry
compatible with the national database. The federal legislation
should also tie the grants to state development of enabling
legislation that sets a finite registration deadline, inside of
which a father's registration guarantees him notice of a
planned or pending adoption. Congress should require such
enabling legislation in order to induce a nationwide effort to
insure the rights of unwed fathers and secure the stable
placement of children for adoption. Because the federal
government's contribution would be limited to the erection of a
registry database to which States would both contribute
information and access information, and because state law
would continue to determine adoption procedure, any
litigation surrounding the use of the registry would remain in
state courts or at least rely upon state law.
The national database should register the following data for
any father: name, date of birth, social security number, driver's
license number, home address, telephone number, place and
address of employment, name and last known address of the
mother, location of possible conception, month(s) and/or years
of possible conception, birth date of child or expected delivery
date, name and gender and birth date of the child if known,
and the identification of any court action involving the child.
Congress should limit those who may register a claim to two
classes: (1) the States relaying their own state registry
information; and (2) the putative fathers themselves or their
attorneys. Congress should limit those who may access
information to four classes: (1) public agencies and licensedprivate agencies accessing information for an adoption; (2)
licensed attorneys planning or executing an adoption; (3)
mothers who wish to search for their own names; and (4) state
vital-statistics agencies maintaining putative father registries.
Congress should permit state vital-statistics agencies
maintaining registries to search in the event that state law
entitles only that agency to make a national database search.
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Congress should set fees for registration and for searches of
the national database and establish a mechanism for indigent
putative fathers to register without cost. The fees should be set
at levels that reflect the cost of maintaining the database.
Congress should establish mechanisms to protect the
integrity of the database and the privacy of women named by
requiring verified and notarized registrations from state
agencies and putative fathers or their representatives and
verified and notarized search requests from agencies, adoption
attorneys, state vital statistics departments, and mothers
themselves. Congress should criminalize attempted or actual
false filings as well as searches made or attempted to be made
in the absence of a planned adoption-with the exception of
mothers, who should be able to search their own name at any
time.
Congress should establish minimal protocols for the
processes of registering and searching that insure the timeliness
of both electronic filing of registrations and electronic search
responses. Registration in the national registry should occur the
same day as the registration is received and the national
database should be able to process a proper search and send
the results within twenty-four hours.
V. CONCLUSION

A full thirty-three percent of children are born to unmarried
mothers. Children born to unmarried mothers are adopted at a
higher rate than children born to married women.
Contemporary dating relationships, where couples do not
maintain an association after sexual intercourse, are
commonplace. The high birth rate to unmarried women and
the unsteady nature of today's dating relationships create a
quandary of how best to protect the rights of unmarried
fathers. Protection of these fathers' rights is further confounded
by ever amplifying globalization, which increases interstate
and intercontinental travel and results in adoptions affecting
the rights of residents of multiple States or even multiple
countries.198 The Supreme Court has held that unmarried men
have an inchoate right to develop a relationship with their
198. See, e.g., Alexandra Maravel, IntercountryAdoption and the Flightfrom Unwed
Fathers'Rights:WHose Right is it Anyway?, 48 S.C. L. REV. 497 (1997).
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children and that putative father registries are a constitutional
means of protecting those unwed fathers' rights while
advancing the prompt and secure placement of children in
adoptive homes.
Developing a national database for putative father registries
and ultimately making it available to men of other countries
who conceive in the United States is the only means of
protecting the rights of unmarried men in adoptions where the
rights of residents of two or more States are involved.
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Chart of State Statutes Describing Paternity Registries
State

Cite

Time

1. Alabama

ALA. CODE § 2610C-1 (2001)

Within 30 days
of or before birth
(§26-10C-1(i))

2. Arizona

ARIz. REV. STAT.
§ 8-106.01 (2001)

Within 30 days
of or before birth
(§ 8-106.01(B))

No notice;
consent to
adoption not
required (§ 8106.01(E))

3. Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-18-702
(Michie 2001)

Before birth or
adoption
Petition
(§ 20-18-702(c))

No notice (§ 9-9224)

4. Colorado

CoLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-5-105 (2001):
by filing with
court or registrar
of vital statistics
or by informally
acknowledging
or declaring his
possible
paternity (§ 19-4-

Does not state

No notice

Does not state

No longer an
interested party
in adoption
§ 46b-172a(h)

Consequence
For Failure to
File
Irrevocable
implied consent
to adoption (§
26-10c-1(i))

105(c)-(e))

5. Connecticut

CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45A716(B) (2001)
putative father
who has
acknowledged
paternity in
writing shall be
given notice

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1080 2001-2002

No. 3]

Toward a NationalPutative FatherRegistry

Publication
Requirement

Impossibility
Exception

Paternity Action
Requirement
No

No

No

Yes,
(§8-106.01(G))

Yes, if.
(1) impossible to
register within time
specified; and
(2) notice of claim of
paternity filed within
30 days after possible to

No

file (§(8-106.01(E))
No

No

No

Yes, (§ 19-5-105(5))
failure to file action
within 30 days of notice
will likely result in
termination of parental
rights

No

No

Yes, within 60 days
after notice must file a
claim for paternity
(§46b-172a(a))

No, but exception if
father has shown a
reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or
responsibility for the
child's welfare (§ 46b172a(h))

No
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Consequence
For Failure to
File

6. Florida

7. Georgia

8. Hawaii

9. Idaho

FLA. STAT. CH.

88.2011 (2001)
Jurisdiction
extended to an
individual
asserting parentage in a tribunal
or in a putative
father registry
maintained in
this state
GA. CODE ANN. §
19-11-9 (2001)

No later than

Still entitled to

period beginning
two years
immediately
prior to the
child's birth (§
19-8-12(b)(3))

notice if: identity
is known to the
petitioner, etc.,
or if biological
father has
performed
certain acts (§ 198-12)

HAW. REV. STAT.

May bring action

Consent not

§ 578-2(D)(5)

within 30 days of

required (RULE

(2000)

child's birth or

HAW. ST. FAM.

if file in writing,
then treated as
presumed father
and entitled to
notice

before mother
gives consent to
adoption (§ 5846(a))

CT. 104(D)(5))

IDAHO CODE §

Before birth,
placement for
adoption in
home of
prospective
parents, or
termination of
parental rights of
birth mother,
whichever
occurs first (§ 16-

Barred from
bringing or
maintaining any
action to
establish
paternity (§ 161513(4))

16-1513 (Michie
1999)

1513(2))
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Paternity Action
Requirement

Publication
Requirement

Impossibility
Exception

Yes, must file within 30
days a petition to
legitimate child(§ 19-812(0(1)-(3))

No

Yes,
(§ 19-11-9(d)(5))

No

No

No

Yes, (§ 16-1513(4))

No

No

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1083 2001-2002

1083

1084

HarvardJournalofLaw & PublicPolicy
State

Cite

[Vol. 25

Time

Consequence
For Failure to
File

10. Illinois

750 ILL. COmP.
STAT. 50/12.1
(2001)

Before or within
30 days of birth
(750 ILCS
50/12.1(b))

No notice; prima
facie evidence of
sufficient
grounds for
termination of
parental rights
50/12.1(h)

11. Indiana

IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 31-19-5-12
(Michie 2001)

1) Before the
child's birth;
2) Within 30
days of birth; or
3)Prior to the
date of filing a
petition for the
child's adoption,
whichever
occurs later (§

No notice;
irrevocable
implied consent
to adoption
(§ 31-19-5-18)

12. Iowa

IOWA CODE §
144.12A (2002)

Before birth, but
not later than
filing of petition
for termination
of rights (§
144.12A (2)(a))

Entitled to notice
as "necessary
party" under §
600A.6(1) if
register; unclear
if no filing

13. Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:400
(West 2002)

Before or after
birth
(§ 9:400(2))

Filing creates a
rebuttable
presumption of
the father. But
that filing does
not require the
consent of the
putative father
for adoption
(§400.1)

31-19-5-12 (a))
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Paternity Action
Requirement
Yes, 30 days after
receipt of notice must
file a declaration of
paternity or request to
be notified of any
further proceedings
(50/12a(2))

Impossibility
Exception

Publication
Requirement

Yes, if 1) impossible to
register within time; 2)
failure not his fault; and
3) he registered within
10 days after possible
for him to file; lack of
knowledge of
pregnancy or birth is no
excuse
(50/12.1(g)(1)-(3))
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes, within 30 days of
notice
(§ 31-19-9-12 (1)(B))

1085

Yes, each 1) clerk of
circuit court 2) branch
file of motor vehicles,
etc., ... shall post in a
conspicuous place a
notice that informs the
public about the
purpose and operation
of the registry (§ 31-195-14 (a))
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Cite

Time

Consequence
For Failure to

14.
Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS

No notice
(implicit in 210 §
4A)

15.
Michigan

MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 710.33
(2001)

Before termination of
mother's
parental rights or
before surrender
of child for
adoption
(210 § 4A)
Before birth
(§ 710.33(1))

16. Minnesota

MINN. STAT.

File

17. Missouri

ch. 210, § 4A
(2002)

Does not address

Before or within

1) Cannot assert

259.52 (2001)

30 days of birth
(§ 259.52(7))

interest during
pending
adoption;
2) No notice;
3) Considered to
have abandoned
child
(§259.52(8)).
Prima facie
evidence of
sufficient
grounds for
termination of
parental rights

Mo. REV. STAT. §
192.016 (2001)

Before or within
15 days of birth

Implied consent
to adoption

(§ 453.030(3))

(§ 453.030(3))

§
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Toward a NationalPutativeFatherRegistry

Paternity Action
Requirement

Impossibility
Exception

1087

Publication
Requirement

Yes, persons claiming
paternity may within 30
days from the date of
the mailing of the
notice file a petition for
adoption or custody
(210 § 4A)

No

No

No

No

No

Yes,
(§ 259.52(10))
within 30 days of notice
must file a completed
intent to claim parental
rights form stating that
he intends to initiate a
paternity action within
30 days of notice

Yes,
(§ 259.52(8)) if clear and
convincing evidence
i) impossible to register
in time ii) failure was
not his fault; iii)
registered within 10
days after if became
possible to file
(§259.52(10)) -with
regard to paternity
action: not bar to
receiving notice if good
cause shown. Then
father must be allowed
more time to initiate
paternity action

Yes,
(§ 259.52(1)(a)) may
establish information
material and public
service announcements
as necessary

Yes,
(§453.030(3)(2)(c))

No

Yes,
(§ 192.016(7)(2)-(3))
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Consequence
For Failure to
File

18. Montana

19. Nebraska

Before birth or

No notice (§42-

ANN. § 42-2-202
(2001)

within 72 hours
of birth;
knowledge of
pregnancy not
required (§ 42-2206(1)-(2))

2-203(204)(205))

NEB. REV. STAT. §

Within 5
business days
after the birth or
within five days
of notice
contemplated in
§ 43-104.12 or
within 5 days
after the last date
of any published
notice,
whichever is
later (§ 43-

No notice;
implied consent;
termination of
parental rights (§
43-104.04 & § 43104.05)

MONT.

CODE

43-104.01 (2001)

104.02)

20. New
Hampshire

N.H. REV STAT.
ANN. § 170-B:5a(I)(c) (2001)

21. New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32A-5-20
(Michie 2001)

Before birth but
must be before
mother's rights
are voluntarily
relinquished, the
mother consents
to adoption, or
the mother's
rights are
involuntarily
terminated
(§ 170-B:5-a(I)(c))
Within 10 days
of birth
(§ 32A-5-19(E))

No notice;
abandonment of
child; bars
paternity action;
(§ 170-B:5-a(I)(c))

Implied consent;
relinquishment
not required (3
32A-5-19)
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Toward a NationalPutativeFatherRegistry
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Paternity Action
Requirement

Impossibility
Exception

Publication
Requirement

No, but must appear at
hearing held on the
petition to terminate
parental rights (§ 42-2208)

Yes, with four part test,
including concealment
of location by the
mother and reasonable
efforts by the father
(§42-2-230(4))

Yes, A notice provided
by department that
informs the public must
be posted in
conspicuous places
(§ 42-2-214(2)-(3))

Yes,
(§ 43-104.05)
within 30 days of filing

No

Optional, the
department may
develop information
about the registry and
distribute such
information through
their existing
publications, to the
news media and the
public
(§ 43-104.01(5))

Yes, within 30 days of
notice must request a
hearing at which he
will have the burden of
proving that he is the
father of the child (§
170-B:5-(a)(fl))

No

No

No

No

No
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N.Y. Soc. SERV. §
372-C (2000)

Does not
specifically state
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Consequence
For Failure to
File

22. New York

No notice (N.Y.
DOM. REL. 111A(2)(B))

23. Ohio

OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 3107.062

Within 30 days
after birth (§

Implied consent
(83107.07(B)(1))

(Anderson 2001)

3107.07(B)(1)

24. Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 7506-1.1
(2000)

No specific time
given

No notice

25. Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. §
109.096 (1999)

Must be on file at
the time of
placement of
child in physical
custody for
purpose of
adoption (§

Barred from
contesting
adoption
(§ 109.096(3) & §
109.098(2)-(3))

109.096(3))
26. Pennsylvania

23 PA. CONS.

STAT. § 5103(B)
(2001)- putative
father entitled to
notice of any
proceeding
brought to
terminate any
parental rights
27. Tennessee

TENN. CODE

ANN. § 36-2-318
(2001)

Before or within
30 days after
birth (§ 36-2318(e)(3))

Normal
requirements to
terminate
parental rights
must be met (see
§ 36-1-17), even
if not registered

(§36-2-318(d)(2))
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Paternity Action
Requirement

Impossibility
Exception

Publication
Requirement

No

No

No

No

No

Yes,
(§ 3107.065(B))

No (§ 7503-3.1(B)(2)(a))

Yes, if by clear and
convincing evidence
can show failure to
appear due to
unavoidable
circumstances; must file
application within 10
days of failure to
appear (§ 7505-2.1(G))

Yes,
(§7506-1.10)(2))

No

Yes, if within 1 year
after entry of final
decree or order proves
in court fraud by
petitioner (§ 109.096(8))

No

Yes, within 30 days of
notice must file suit or
intervene in adoption,
otherwise sufficient
cause to terminate
parental rights (§ 36-23180))

No

No
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Consequence
For Failure to
File
Cannot assert
interest in child
other than by
filing paternity
suit before
termination of
his parental
rights
(§ 160.258)

Cite

Time

28. Texas

TEx. FAM. CODE §
160.256 (2002)

Before birth or
within 30 days of
birth (§
160.256(c))

29. Utah

UTAH CODE ANN.

Before mother

Waiver and

§ 78-30-4.14
(2001)

consents to
adoption or
relinquishes
child to
placement
agency (§ 78-304.14(1)(e))
Any time (§ 1110(a))

surrender of any
right in relation
to the child
(§ 78-30-4.14(5)

WIS. STAT. §

Anytime before

If paternity has

48.025 (2001)

termination of
the father's
rights (§
48.025(2))

not been
acknowledged
court may or
may not order
notice by
publication (§

Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1- 22-117
(Michie 2001)

Before or after
birth of child out
of wedlock (§ 122-117(a)(ii) or if
father has
acknowledged
paternity prior to
an interlocutory
hearing (§ 1-22108(d))

State

30. Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN.

tit. 15A, § 1-110
(2001)
31. Wisconsin

None

48.42(4)(b)(2)-(4))

32. Wyoming

If father
unknown, court
may be approve
adoption
without his
consent (§ 1-22110(a))
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Paternity Action
Requirement

Publication
Requirement

Impossibility
Exception
Yes, if father's identity
and location are
known, even if failed to
register (§ 161.002(b)(2))

No

Yes, if child is under
the age of 6 months (§
78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i))

No

No

No

N/A

No

No

No

No

Yes, within 30 days of
notice must advise of
his interest in or
responsibility for the
child or his declaration
of paternity
(§ 1-22-110(a)(vi))

No, unless he is
identified by the
mother or agency or
has lived with or
married the mother
after the birth of the
child before adoption
petition and if before
interlocutory hearing of
he has acknowledged
the child as his own
1-22-108(d))

No
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